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  INTRODUCTION   
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the U.S. Su-
preme Court dramatically limited the extraterritorial reach of 
federal securities law, finding that the antifraud provisions of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
10b-5 do not extend to securities transactions outside the Unit-
ed States.1 The decision rejects over four decades of case law 
embracing the Second Circuit’s “conduct and effects” tests.2 In-
stead the Court adopts a geographic test it perceives to be a 
bright-line rule, applying Section 10(b) only to securities trans-
actions inside the United States.3
In Morrison, Australian plaintiffs, who purchased shares of 
National Australia Bank (NAB) on an Australian stock ex-
change, claimed that Australian bank officials had misled them 
about the performance of a U.S. mortgage subsidiary.
  
4 The 
plaintiffs sued NAB and other defendants in New York under 
Section 10(b), claiming that the involvement of the U.S. subsid-
iary in the alleged fraud was sufficient justification to apply 
Section 10(b) extraterritorially to transactions in the parent 
company’s stock on the Australian stock exchange.5 The Second 
Circuit rejected this claim under its conduct and effects tests,6
 
 1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881–83 (2010); 
see 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 
 2. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (citing SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–
93 (2d Cir. 2003)). Under the Second Circuit’s “conduct and effects” tests, the 
extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions in Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act required that the alleged wrongful conduct 
had substantial effects in the United States (the “effects test”) or that suffi-
cient conduct occurred in the United States even though the effect was only on 
investors elsewhere (the “conduct test”). Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93. 
 3. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–86. 
 4. Id. at 2873. 
 5. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008), 
aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 6. Id. at 176.  
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but the Australian shareholders appealed. The Supreme Court 
again rejected their claim, but the Court also rejected the con-
duct and effects tests.7 The Court held that securities-fraud 
suits cannot be brought under U.S. law against foreign defend-
ants by foreign plaintiffs who bought securities outside the 
United States because “the focus of the Exchange Act is not up-
on the place where the deception originated, but upon purchas-
es and sales of securities in the United States.”8 Thus, the 
Court rejected the views of the U.S. Solicitor General and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the Act 
should apply to fraud in an extraterritorial securities transac-
tion that “involves significant conduct in the United States that 
is material to the fraud’s success.”9 The Court stated that Sec-
tion 10(b) reaches only fraud in connection with the “purchase 
or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and 
the purchase or sale of any other security in the United 
States.”10
The logic of the holding in Morrison strongly suggests that 
the SEC would no longer have enforcement rights with respect 
to securities transactions taking place outside the United 
States. Congress, however, intervened one month later with 
Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act that purported to reinstate 
the conduct and effects tests for lawsuits brought by the SEC or 
the Department of Justice (DOJ).
  
11
For private lawsuits, Morrison’s curtailment of the reach of 
U.S. securities laws potentially expands the opportunity for 
other jurisdictions to compete with U.S. securities law by 
providing their own combination of legal rules, private rights of 
action, and government enforcement mechanisms.
  
12
 
 7. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885–86. 
 Whereas 
 8. Id. at 2884.  
 9. Id. at 2886 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 16, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191)). 
 10. Id. at 2888.  
 11. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). There is some debate about whether this pro-
vision actually changed the scope of Section 10(b), which would be required to 
legislatively overrule Morrison. Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 205 (2011) [hereinafter Painter, Extraterritorial Ju-
risdiction]. 
 12. See generally Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the Euro-
pean Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 173 (2010) (discussing some of the effects 
of class actions in the United States that could have precipitated increased 
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before Morrison there was always the possibility that U.S. law 
might also apply to some transactions outside the United 
States, after Morrison transacting parties can be confident that 
U.S. law will not apply in private suits provided their transac-
tions are definitively outside the United States. In an attempt 
to restrict the reach of the Morrison decision and to test its lim-
its, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys have brought other cases.13 
Most of these cases focus on determining the geographic loca-
tion of a transaction—a critical factor in the Morrison decision 
that was not fully explained because the location of the Aus-
tralian transactions was relatively easy to determine.14
The Morrison decision has important implications for ju-
risdictional competition in securities law. Because of indicia 
that jurisdictional competition post-Morrison could evolve in 
two different ways, this Article distinguishes between “Choice 
of Law Competition” and “Forum Competition.”
  
15
 
competition from other countries); Merritt B. Fox, Fraud-on-the-Market Class 
Actions Against Foreign Issuers (
 Jurisdictions 
Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 400, 
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1831453.  
 13. See, e.g., In re Infineon Techs. AG Sec. Litig., No. C04-04156 JW, 2011 
WL 7121006 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC 
Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Au-
to. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Absolute Activist Value 
Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm, No. 09-CV-08862 (GBD), 2010 WL 5415885 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss 
Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Société Générale 
Sec. Litig., No. 08-Civ.-2495, 2010 WL 3910286, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010); In 
re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Quail Cruises 
Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 732 F. Supp. 2d 
1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. 
Fla. 2010); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010).  
 14. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
 15. The parameters of jurisdictional competition in U.S. and European 
substantive corporate law have been analyzed extensively by commentators. 
See, e.g., ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); 
Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter & Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competi-
tion in EU Corporate Law After Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s Product 
for Europe, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 159 (2005) (discussing European 
law and to some extent securities law); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. 
Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Lia-
bility Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91 (2011); Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann 
O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661 (2008); 
Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regula-
tion, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001); Roberta Romano, Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 
(1998). The characteristics of competition among jurisdictions hoping to estab-
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competing to design securities laws that appeal to transacting 
parties ex ante (before a dispute emerges) engage in “Choice of 
Law Competition.”16
Jurisdictions that take steps only to expand the jurisdic-
tion of their courts as venues for litigation engage in “Forum 
Competition.” Forum Competition usually involves a jurisdic-
tion’s courts applying the jurisdiction’s own law, but sometimes 
courts will apply the law of another jurisdiction. A jurisdiction 
can engage in Forum Competition by inducing parties to agree 
ex ante to use its courts as a litigation forum, but most Forum 
Competition turns on a jurisdiction’s attractiveness to lawyers 
ex post. These jurisdictions ignore the preferences of transact-
ing parties ex ante and appeal only to the preferences of some 
transacting parties and their lawyers after a dispute has aris-
en.
 Jurisdictions that are successful in Choice 
of Law Competition often bring securities transactions within 
their borders because locating a transaction within a jurisdic-
tion is one of the easiest ways to choose its law. Jurisdictions 
engaged in Choice of Law Competition usually offer a litigation 
forum as well as substantive law. Transacting parties some-
times choose both the substantive law and the same jurisdic-
tion’s forum, but sometimes they choose a jurisdiction’s sub-
stantive law with a different forum by agreeing to arbitrate or 
to litigate in another jurisdiction.  
17
 
lish a forum within their borders for litigation that appeals to lawyers, i.e., 
“Forum Competition,” has not been addressed in as much of the commentary, 
particularly in the transatlantic context. Competition for substantive legal 
rules plays only a secondary role in Forum Competition, because substantive 
legal rules may have a diminished level of relevance if national courts do not 
have an opportunity to enforce their substantive legal rules and transacting 
parties cannot rely upon other courts to enforce those rules.  
 Before Morrison, the United States was to some extent 
 16. Choice of Law Competition is a subcategory of jurisdictional competi-
tion. The emphasis in Choice of Law Competition is on substantive legal rules 
to attract contracting parties. Adjudication of disputes may be of secondary 
importance in Choice of Law Competition. 
 17. On the supply side, the latter form of Forum Competition does not in-
volve states offering a bundled product of corporate law and adjudication. A 
country that makes it more difficult to draw transacting parties to its courts 
for litigation is less likely to attract plaintiffs’ attorneys wishing to file law-
suits in that country. A number of factors on the supply side could make it less 
likely for courts in some competing countries to attract lawsuits: (1) language 
barriers (particularly for countries whose courts do not do business in Eng-
lish), (2) lack of ability to overcome differences between common law and civil 
law approaches to adjudication (some civil law countries, like Germany, may 
struggle with this problem particularly), (3) lack of ability to overcome proce-
dural differences between courts of different countries, (4) lack of judicial ex-
pertise of judges in the required areas of law (not all countries have judges 
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engaged in this type of Forum Competition when U.S. courts 
provided a forum for “foreign cubed” cases in which foreign 
plaintiffs sued foreign defendants over securities transactions 
taking place outside the United States (none of the Australian 
parties to the Morrison case had expressed a preference for 
U.S. law at the time of their securities transactions in Austral-
ia).18
As a result of the Morrison decision, limiting application of 
U.S. securities laws to transactions inside the United States, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys may increasingly look to European coun-
tries and other venues to file securities class actions and simi-
lar suits. Even lawsuits involving securities transactions inside 
the United States face steep hurdles as the Supreme Court has 
curtailed plaintiffs’ securities litigation in several other deci-
sions.
 
19
 
with substantial training), (5) the cost to a country of building specialized ju-
dicial expertise in the required areas of the law, (6) incomplete information 
about real or perceived judicial bias in the respective country, and (7) uncer-
tainty about mutual recognition of judgments internationally and within the 
European Union.  
 There is some doubt about the continued viability of 
On the demand side of Forum Competition, plaintiffs’ attorneys seek out 
the jurisdiction that offers the highest chance of procedural success in any giv-
en lawsuit. Procedural success here can mean a high likelihood that a court in 
the respective country will find subject matter jurisdiction and will enable the 
attorneys to overcome a motion to dismiss. While the substantive legal rules in 
the respective country would have to offer adequate and comparable legal pro-
tections for the plaintiffs, the likelihood of succeeding on the merits under the 
substantive legal rules in that respective jurisdiction, i.e., substantive success, 
may be secondary. Plaintiffs’ attorneys may be willing to forego some substan-
tive claims if the respective jurisdiction offers a lot of procedural leeway by, for 
instance, allowing suits to proceed with parties who are not citizens or resi-
dents of the respective country and have otherwise rather tenuous connections 
to the jurisdiction. 
 18. The evaluations in this article pertaining to competitive structures 
between fora are based on limited data. The authors evaluate trends in a lim-
ited number of European countries and recognize that the number of securi-
ties litigation cases in Europe is substantially lower than the number of cases 
in the United States.  
 19. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
152 (2008) (holding that fraud claims cannot be brought against a third party 
who did not directly mislead investors but was a business partner with those 
who mislead investors); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 310 (2007) (stating that courts must take into account “plausible opposing 
inference” when examining whether a plaintiff adequately plead strong infer-
ence of scienter). With respect to curtailment of class actions generally, see 
also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (curbing 
class certification); AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 
(2011) (upholding standard form consumer contracts that mandated arbitra-
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class actions in the United States in general.20 Given these de-
velopments, European countries may have enhanced opportuni-
ties to capitalize on the increasing demand for a jurisdiction 
outside of the United States in which to litigate. European ju-
risdictions may also have an opportunity to engage in Forum 
Competition with the United States by providing and improv-
ing upon features of the U.S. legal system that lawyers find at-
tractive. The European Union is also a particularly attractive 
place for Forum Competition with the United States if a judg-
ment obtained against a defendant in one member state can be 
enforced anywhere in the European Union, a region with an 
aggregate economy about the same size as the U.S. economy.21
Thus, even those securities fraud lawsuits that could be 
filed in the United States after Morrison might still be filed in a 
European jurisdiction that has substantive law and procedures 
that are superior to U.S. substantive law and procedures for 
plaintiffs and their lawyers. Unlike U.S. class actions, these 
suits could include plaintiffs whose securities transactions took 
place outside the United States as well as plaintiffs whose se-
curities transactions took place inside the United States.  
  
There is some evidence that, post-Morrison, other jurisdic-
tions—most notably the Netherlands—have started to expand 
the jurisdiction of their courts to cover securities transactions 
taking place elsewhere.22
The Netherlands appears to be replicating some of the 
most attractive attributes of the U.S. securities-litigation sys-
tem. An important distinguishing feature that so far has made 
U.S. courts very appealing to international litigants—at least 
 These jurisdictions may be setting up 
forums within their borders that appeal to lawyers, and after 
Morrison may replace the United States as the leader in extra-
territorial securities litigation Forum Competition.  
 
tion despite state law determination that they were unconscionable adhesion 
contracts). 
 20. John C. Coffee Jr., The Death of Stockholder Litigation?, NAT’L L.J., 
Feb. 13, 2012, at 14, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ 
.jsp?id=1202541959250&The_death_of_stockholder_litigation&slreturn=1.  
 21. See The U.S. and Europe: Governments of Equal Size?, ECON. POLI-
CIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.economics21.org/ 
commentary/us-and-europe-governments-equal-size. 
 22. See Class Actions: A Global Update, ALLEN & OVERY (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Class-Actions--A-Global 
-Update.aspx; Kevin LaCroix, Dutch Court Holds Collective Securities Settle-
ment to Be Binding, D & O DIARY (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:32 AM), 
www.dandodiary.com/2012/01/articles/securities-litigation/dutch-court-holds 
-collective-securities-settlement-to-be-binding/. 
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plaintiffs—is the availability of class actions and the “fraud-on-
the-market theory” that allows plaintiffs to allege that they 
were defrauded because they bought or sold a security at a 
market price that was affected by the alleged fraud.23 While an 
increasing number of jurisdictions may recognize class actions 
in limited circumstances,24 only a few countries, such as the 
United States, Canada, South Korea, and the Netherlands, rec-
ognize some variation of the fraud-on-the-market theory.25
 
 23. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). Under the fraud-
on-the-market theory, a plaintiff is presumed to have relied on a defendant’s 
material misrepresentation if the misrepresentation pertained to a security 
that was traded in an efficient market and the price of the security was affect-
ed. Id. 
 Un-
 24. See infra Part III (discussing Choice of Law Competition, as jurisdic-
tions compete to design laws and procedures that induce parties to locate 
transactions in their jurisdictions).  
 25. See Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, 138.3 
(Can.); [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, 
Aug. 3, 2007 (S. Kor.), available at http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/lr/list03.jsp? 
menu=0203&bbsid=BBS0087; HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. 
Frielink (VEB e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken 
.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162; Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence 
on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1508 (2004) (“Korea has 
often looked to the U.S. securities regime as a model for how to regulate the 
Korean securities markets.”); Dae Hwan Chung, Introduction to South Korea’s 
New Securities-Related Class Action, 30 J. CORP. L. 165 (2004); Erik S. 
Knutsen, Closing the Gate on Ontario Securities Class Actions, 2006 QUEEN’S 
BUS. L. SYMP. 157, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1164262 (“[P]roof of reliance is unnecessary under s. 138.3(4). The 
representative class plaintiff only has to prove the misrepresentation elements 
enumerated in the statute: that the person who bought or sold the security 
suffered damage because of the issuer’s failure to report a material change. 
Reliance upon the actual incorrect information is not a relevant consideration 
for success.”); A. C. Pritchard & Janis P. Sarra, Securities Class Actions Move 
North: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Actions in Can-
ada, 47 ALBERTA L. REV. 881, 892 (2010) (“As with the primary market provi-
sions, there is a deemed reliance provision under the new secondary market 
provisions in Canada. Under this provision, the plaintiff does not need to 
demonstrate reliance on the misrepresentation or on the issuer’s failure to dis-
close as required.”); Chung Dong-yoon, Open Season for Securities-Related 
Class Actions, KOREA HERALD (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.koreaherald.com/ 
specialreport/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20070109000043 (“The Korean Securities 
Exchange Act has the same burden of proof rule in the exchange market as in 
the new issuance market and as a result, a plaintiff need not prove the scien-
ter, reliance, transaction and loss causation, which really is a vexing prob-
lem.”); Kim Rahn, First Class-Action Suit in Offing, KOREA TIMES (June 25, 
2009), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113_47475 
.html. Similarly, after a class action regime was introduced in Italy, the Ital-
ian Supreme Court adopted something comparable to the U.S. fraud-on-the-
market theory, introducing a presumption of reliance and, thus, allowing in-
vestors to bring a claim based on a misleading statement in a prospectus or 
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like courts in other European countries, the Dutch Supreme 
Court in its World Online decision established a presumption of 
reliance/causation for cases involving prospectus liability.26 The 
World Online decision uses a variant of the fraud-on-the-
market theory,27 at least in the context of prospectus liability. 
Dutch courts could extend the theories used in the World 
Online holding to other areas of Dutch law, such as liability for 
misrepresentation in periodic disclosure and other types of se-
curities fraud. The Netherlands also allows plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to use an opt-out class, e.g., class members described in the 
complaint are included in the litigation unless they opt out, ra-
ther than requiring an opt-in class, the approach favored by 
most other European countries.28
Another Dutch case, Stichting Investor Claims Against 
Fortis v. Ageas N.V.,
  
29 illustrates the possible appeal of the 
Dutch legal system to plaintiffs’ lawyers. The case was original-
ly filed in the Southern District of New York but had been dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the pre-
Morrison conduct and effects tests.30 The case was subsequently 
filed in a court in Utrecht, the Netherlands, where it is pend-
ing.31
 
official company announcement without having read the respective document. 
ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 
 Similarly, in its Converium decision, another case that 
had initially been filed in the United States, the Amsterdam 
22; see also Bas J. de Jong, Liability for Misrepre-
sentation—European Lessons on Causation from the Netherlands, 8 EUR. 
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 352, 364–65 (2011) (discussing the World Online de-
cision and its implications); Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities 
Markets: Effects on Investor Protection, 41 INT'L LAW. 1121, 1139–41 (2007) 
(explaining the differences between the Dutch and U.S. systems of securities 
litigation and underscoring the attractiveness of the Dutch rules).  
 26. See HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. Frielink (VEB 
e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ 
detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162; see also de Jong, supra note 25, at 364–65 (dis-
cussing the World Online decision and its implications); Thompson, supra note 
25 (explaining the differences of the Dutch and U.S. systems of securities liti-
gation and underscoring the attractiveness of the Dutch rules).  
 27. See infra Part II.B.3. (discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory). 
 28. Thompson, supra note 25, at 1141. 
 29. Writ of Summons, (Stichting Investor Claims Against Fortis/Ageas 
N.V.) (Utrecht July 7, 2011) (Neth.) [hereinafter Fortis Writ], available at 
http://investorclaimsagainstfortis.com/Attachment/194_00052559.PDF. 
 30. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The 
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims 
brought by plaintiffs and reasoned that the alleged fraudulent activity took 
place abroad. Plaintiffs did not adequately allege substantial “effects” in the 
United States. Id. 
 31. Fortis Writ, supra note 29.  
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Court of Appeal declared an international collective settlement 
to be binding on the parties.32 In Converium, the class members 
had very limited ties to the Netherlands (none of the defend-
ants and only a few plaintiffs were domiciled in the Nether-
lands), the alleged wrongdoing took place outside the Nether-
lands, and the claims were not brought under Dutch law.33 
There is some evidence that even without a single interested 
person domiciled in the Netherlands, the Court could have up-
held jurisdiction in the Netherlands to declare the settlement 
binding.34
The Fortis, World Online, and Converium cases, among 
others, provide a first impression of a possible trajectory for Fo-
rum Competition after Morrison. If these cases are representa-
tive of future trends, some litigation may move toward the 
Netherlands and away from the United States.  
 
U.S. courts could respond to these developments and con-
tinue to engage in limited Forum Competition by retaining ju-
risdiction over some cases and applying foreign securities law 
to transactions that take place outside the United States. Han-
nah L. Buxbaum notes in this context that “it appears both 
theoretically and doctrinally possible that U.S. courts in the fu-
ture might consider applying foreign securities law to fraud 
claims, thus opening an avenue for recovery by investors in-
jured in foreign investment transactions.”35
 
 32. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. J.S. 
Kortmann (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS) (Neth.), translated in 
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/Judgmentof12Novermber2010CourtofAp
peal.pdf; see also Hof ’s-Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m.nt. B.J. 
de Jong (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS) (Neth.) [hereinafter 
Converium COA Decision], available at http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/ 
pnc/9/media.1139.pdf. 
 Another approach 
may be for U.S. courts to apply state law to some claims con-
cerning securities transactions outside the United States if 
 33. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. J.S. 
Kormann (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS) (Neth.), translated in 
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/Judgmentof12Novermber2010Court
ofAppeal.pdf. 
 34. See Legal Alert, Converium: Dutch Court Has Jurisdiction to Declare 
an International Collective Settlement of Mass Claims Binding, DE BRAUW 
BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK (Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Legal Alert 
Converium], http://www.debrauw.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legal% 
20Alerts/Litigation%20Arbitration/Legal%20Alert%20International%20Litigat
ion%20-%2015%20November%202010.html. 
 35. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Fed-
eral Securities Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 175 (2012) (discussing con-
tingency for applying foreign securities laws in U.S. courts).  
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fraudulent selling efforts are directed at residents of a state 
(courts will probably dismiss most state law claims on forum 
non conveniens grounds when a transaction is outside the 
United States, but Morrison does not directly rule on the ap-
plicability of state securities fraud laws, and some instances of 
fraud might be actionable under state law after Morrison). Af-
ter Morrison, applying foreign law or state law to foreign 
transactions may be the only viable way for U.S. courts to en-
gage in Forum Competition in this segment of securities litiga-
tion.  
Another consequence of Morrison is that transacting par-
ties now have a clear path to avoid private litigation under U.S. 
law by locating their transactions outside the United States. 
Private parties—presumably, including U.S. investors and is-
suers—thus can opt in to the law of another jurisdiction. Alt-
hough the Dodd-Frank Act still contemplates SEC and DOJ en-
forcement actions in some circumstances,36
This Article suggests that problems presented in the con-
text of Choice of Law Competition and Forum Competition 
could require different policy responses. Ambiguities in the ge-
ographic “transactional” test in Morrison suggest that the 
United States should consider a choice of law policy response, 
at least for those cases that are unclear as to the geography of a 
transaction and the applicable law. The Supreme Court’s 
transactional test in Morrison is easy to manipulate, so to some 
extent transacting parties already can choose their law by 
choosing their geography. We propose redirecting the focal 
point of securities regulation in geographically ambiguous 
transactions away from tests for determining geographic loca-
tion of transactions and toward the parties’ choice of law. 
 the parties can bind 
themselves not to sue each other under U.S. law by agreeing to 
complete the transaction off shore. In private transactions in 
particular, private parties will notice the factors that courts 
consider important to determining a transaction’s geographic 
location and then manipulate those factors depending upon 
whether they want the transaction to be subject to U.S. law.  
The developments in the Netherlands suggest a possible 
proliferation of Forum Competition. This suggests that the 
Netherlands could attempt to take over a role similar in some 
respects to that of U.S. courts prior to the Morrison decision. 
 
 36. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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Meanwhile, the SEC and DOJ could aggressively use powers 
bestowed by the Dodd-Frank Act to pursue fraud in connection 
with securities transactions outside the United States. It is 
possible that all sides will exercise constraint, but is it also pos-
sible that a broad bilateral or multilateral policy response may 
be needed to constrain these and other Forum Competition de-
velopments. The acceptable outer bounds of Forum Competition 
between the United States and Europe could be defined by 
treaty or multilateral agreement. 
Part I of this Article reviews the costs and benefits of juris-
dictional competition in securities regulation in light of other 
alternatives such as coordination and harmonization of securi-
ties laws in different jurisdictions. We show that experimenta-
tion with different securities regulation regimes can be benefi-
cial. Jurisdictional competition in securities law after Morrison 
is also likely to be bifurcated with private lawsuits moving on a 
different trajectory than government enforcement. Part II ex-
plores recent developments in Europe that indicate a prolifera-
tion of European collective procedures that will likely attract 
plaintiffs and their lawyers. We show that recent case law in 
Dutch settlement procedures expands the jurisdiction of Dutch 
courts. Although the collective settlement of securities matters 
in the Netherlands does not offer plaintiffs all of the attractive 
features provided by securities class actions in the United 
States, the Netherlands is becoming increasingly attractive as 
a jurisdiction for securities litigation. Part III contrasts the ex-
panding jurisdiction of Dutch courts with the limitations im-
posed by the Morrison decision. Part III also discusses ambigui-
ties that arise when Morrison is applied to private securities 
transactions as well as to derivative transactions, such as secu-
rities-based swaps, that are not easy to define geographically as 
being “inside” or “outside” the United States. We argue that re-
lying on parties’ choice of law pertaining to private transac-
tions, and Choice of Law Competition among jurisdictions offer-
ing legal rules to transacting parties, could be more effective 
than relying on geography that is both indeterminate and easy 
to manipulate. Part IV recognizes that the Netherlands, the 
United States, and perhaps other jurisdictions, may ignore 
transacting parties’ ex ante choices and instead engage in Fo-
rum Competition that extends the reach of a jurisdiction’s secu-
rities law extraterritorially in private lawsuits, government en-
forcement, or both. Part IV discusses ways in which the 
acceptable outer bounds of Forum Competition between the 
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United States and Europe could be defined by treaty or multi-
lateral agreement. 
I.  THE FUNDAMENTALS OF JURISDICTIONAL 
COMPETITION   
Jurisdictional competition is now recognized as an im-
portant factor in legal evolution in areas ranging from corpo-
rate law to admiralty law.37
Perhaps most important for the discussion in this Article, 
jurisdictional competition is sometimes allowed to be independ-
ent of the geographic location of parties or transactions.
 Jurisdictions design legal regimes 
to govern certain relationships—mostly contractual in nature—
and then private parties choose which regime to use. The opti-
mal legal regime for a transaction, series of transactions, or on-
going contractual relationship depends upon a number of fac-
tors such as the quality and predictability of legal rules, the 
flexibility of legal rules (does the jurisdiction allow parties to 
choose their rules?), and the cost and quality of adjudication. 
Jurisdictions compete to offer legal rules and adjudication pro-
cedures that attract users. Some users of the legal regime may 
be more attractive to a jurisdiction than others; many jurisdic-
tions, for example, do not want to bring fraudulent transactions 
within their borders. The payoff for the jurisdiction from this 
competition is franchise and other taxes, fees for lawyers and 
other professionals, private sector opportunities for government 
officials and judges, and collateral benefits for other businesses 
in the jurisdiction such as banks and broker-dealers. 
38 The 
legal systems that provide rules and adjudication are usually 
(but not always) rooted in geography, but the users of these 
systems need not always be in the same geographic location. 
This is very different from the traditional geographically-rooted 
jurisdictional competition that still prevails in areas such as in-
come taxation and some aspects of employment and environ-
mental regulation.39 In the traditional geographically-rooted 
form of jurisdictional competition, if parties or transactions are 
located in the particular jurisdiction, they are stuck with its 
rules unless they choose to move. The “seat theory” of corporate 
law that prevailed in Europe for many years40
 
 37. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 
 is an example of 
this more limited type of jurisdictional competition constrained 
15, at 29–31.  
 38. Id. at 68. 
 39. See Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 160–61. 
 40. See id. 
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by geography, whereas the “incorporation theory” in U.S. cor-
porate law and now to some extent in E.U. corporate law is an 
example of the more expansive type of jurisdictional competi-
tion that is less restricted by geography.41
The economic benefits of jurisdictional competition are 
usually described from the vantage point of rational actors act-
ing with near perfect information. One group of rational actors 
designs legal rules and adjudicates disputes over those rules, 
and another group of rational actors decides which legal rules 
shall govern their relationships.
 
42 Another approach to jurisdic-
tional competition, however, emphasizes the fact that both pro-
viders and consumers of legal rules have imperfect information 
and benefit from experimentation with different rules. Some 
commentators draw on theories of “New Institutional Econom-
ics” to suggest that jurisdictional competition can be superior to 
harmonization and coordination if jurisdictional competition 
gives decision makers more opportunity to learn about the ef-
fects of different legal rules.43
In addition to imperfect information, another important 
factor is change. Because market conditions to which legal 
rules apply constantly evolve, rules need to change as well. Ex-
perimentation, observation, and rule revision are part of an on-
going process that may never end with a stable “optimal” rule. 
  
 
 41. Id.  
 42. See id. at 164–65.  
 43. See id. at 182 (discussing the phenomenon of jurisdictional competi-
tion in the evolution of European corporate law). See generally EIRIK G. 
FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 5 (3d ed. 2003) 
(providing an overview of New Institutional Economics); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7–8 
(1990) (discussing the role of institutional change in historical change and 
economics); STEFAN VOIGT, INSTITUTIONENÖKONOMIK [INSTITUTIONAL ECO-
NOMICS] 22–23 (2d ed. 2009); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTI-
TUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 15–17 
(1985) (discussing transaction-cost economics and the role of organizations and 
institutions in the capitalist system); Ronald Coase, The New Institutional 
Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72, 72–74 (1998) (commenting on the inclusion 
of transaction and information costs and the role of social and cultural change 
in New Institutional Economics); Christian Kirchner, Public Choice and New 
Institutional Economics: A Comparative Analysis in Search of Co-operation 
Potentials, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 19, 32 (Pio Baake & 
Rainald Borck eds., 2007) (comparing the Public Choice approach in political 
science to New Institutional Economics); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 
233 passim (1979) (analyzing the role of transaction costs in New Institutional 
Economics theories).  
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The only constant is that continued experimentation with dif-
ferent rules is more advantageous than forming a consensus 
around static rules.44
Finally, experimentation allows for jurisdictions to work 
with non-governmental organizations and other international 
institutions to build consensus—albeit a changing consensus—
on the “soft law” that defines generally accepted standards for 
securities transactions.
 Learning through experimentation is 
probably most effective when jurisdictions experiment with dif-
ferent rules and then discover which ones work and which ones 
do not. Transacting parties affected by legal rules do the same. 
When underlying economic circumstances change, it is more 
likely that a jurisdiction will change its rules if there is juris-
dictional competition than if all jurisdictions are bound to agree 
upon the same rule before they change it. 
45 For example, the International Organ-
ization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is an important 
standard setter for securities regulation in key areas such as 
disclosure regulation in cross border offerings of securities. In 
2008, IOSCO issued a Multilateral Memorandum of Under-
standing setting forth a process that allows national securities 
regulators to obtain assistance from their counterparts in other 
countries with obtaining evidence, witnesses, and the proceeds 
of securities fraud.46 The International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) is another critically important organization that 
has recently turned its attention to valuation of derivative se-
curities and other financial assets in times of financial stress.47
Many of the agreements, memoranda of understanding, 
and procedures developed by these institutions may not be codi-
fied in statutes and regulations of any jurisdiction, but they 
will have a substantial impact on how the legal rules in differ-
ent jurisdictions are actually implemented. Jurisdictions that 
experiment with legal rules, and different ways of enforcing 
those rules, will be able to integrate their legal rules with both 
the legal rules of other jurisdictions and the “soft law” of inter-
national institutions. Jurisdictions that seek unilaterally to de-
fine a single theoretically “correct” approach to a problem, and 
then codify that approach in rules that are difficult to change, 
  
 
 44. See Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 182.  
 45. See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012) (discussing the purpose, 
operation, and limitations of non-binding international financial rules). 
 46. Id. at 77–78. 
 47. Id. at 83. 
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will find it more difficult to integrate their rules with a global 
financial system that could be headed in a different direction.48
Despite its many advantages, jurisdictional competition 
has some detractors. Some commentators emphasize the “race 
to the bottom” phenomenon in which jurisdictions compete for 
private patronage of their legal systems by designing rules that 
bestow lopsided advantages on private actors able to choose the 
legal regime and impose that choice on other actors.
  
49 For ex-
ample, corporate managers may take advantage of jurisdiction-
al competition to impose a jurisdiction’s pro-management cor-
porate law on investors because those investors, for whatever 
reason, have no choice.50
A. THE HARMONIZATION ALTERNATIVE  
 One alternative to jurisdictional com-
petition is harmonization of the law in different jurisdictions 
through multilateral agreements or some other form of stand-
ardization. Another approach is coordination among jurisdic-
tions that have different legal rules so there are some mini-
mum standards for investor protection, employee protection, 
cross border enforcement of judgments or other objectives. Fi-
nally, jurisdictional competition in securities law, as in other 
areas of law, may be bifurcated between private litigation and 
government enforcement, with some jurisdictions seeking ag-
gressively to apply their law extraterritorially to securities 
transactions in one of these spheres but not both. 
The most often mentioned alternative to jurisdictional 
competition is harmonization of legal rules and adjudication 
systems across jurisdictions. The European Union, for example, 
 
 48. Arguably the United States has done this in implementing a securities 
regulation regime that adheres to rules based on Generally Accepted Account-
ing Principles (GAAP) instead of the International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) used in many other parts of the world, although U.S. securities regula-
tion has recently moved to accommodate issuers using International Financial 
Reporting Standards. See Commission Statement in Support of Convergence 
and Global Accounting Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 9494 (Mar. 2, 2010). 
 49. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666–68, 705 (1974); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. 
Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securi-
ties Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 906, 948–50 (1998); Alvin K. Klevorick, 
The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade 
Policy, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 178 (1996). But see RALPH K. WINTER, 
GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 7–11 (1978) (arguing that there is in-
stead a “race to the top” as jurisdictions compete to design better corporate 
law). 
 50. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 15, at 122, 129–30.  
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attempts to harmonize corporate and securities law as well as 
many other areas of the law. Efforts to harmonize the law of 
various jurisdictions are undertaken for a range of reasons, in-
cluding the perceived threat of disparate rules in different ju-
risdictions. Harmonization can be accomplished through bilat-
eral or multilateral agreements, but it can sometimes be 
imposed unilaterally. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was an 
attempt to harmonize some aspects of corporate governance 
law—for example, by imposing a requirement for independent 
directors and audit committees—inside the United States and 
even for non-U.S. issuers with publicly traded securities in the 
United States.51 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 imposed addition-
al corporate governance requirements on financial institutions 
that do business in the United States.52
There are several problems with harmonization. First, the 
“harmonious” rule may be the wrong rule for solving a particu-
lar problem, or the rule could become wrong later based on 
changing circumstances. Financial regulation, for example, is a 
quickly evolving area of law given the enormous changes in 
capital markets in the past several decades and the changes 
that are likely to take place in the future. A harmonious legal 
regime for financial regulation is likely to be the one that all ju-
risdictions agree upon, not necessarily the legal regime that is 
best for all, or even most, of the jurisdictions where it is imple-
mented. Second, harmonization is difficult to accomplish politi-
cally unless there is a central authority that can preempt the 
law in a multitude of jurisdictions or, alternatively, a jurisdic-
tion has so much economic clout that it can impose its rules on 
others. These political problems make harmonization difficult 
to take beyond national borders. Third, harmonization invites 
efforts to undermine harmony by “rogue” jurisdictions that seek 
to benefit by attracting to their legal systems private actors 
who do not agree with the harmonization. Even in organized 
communities of jurisdictions—such as the European Union—
collective action problems make it very difficult to avoid “defec-
tion” by members of the community or other jurisdictions that 
seek to undermine harmonization. In sum, harmonization of le-
gal regimes may not be desirable and, furthermore, may be a 
political and practical impossibility. 
  
 
 51. Id. at 30–31. 
 52. Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 199. 
  
2012] COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LAW 149 
 
B. THE COORDINATION ALTERNATIVE  
Coordination is a “compromise” approach whereby jurisdic-
tions have different legal regimes, and to some extent compete 
to design better regimes, but also coordinate their approaches 
in one or more areas such as: (1) establishing an agreed upon 
ceiling or floor for how much or how little regulation there will 
be in a given area, (2) coordinating enforcement regimes so the 
consequences of breaking legal rules are similar across jurisdic-
tions, (3) coordinating adjudication regimes so private parties 
have relatively similar remedies across jurisdictions, (4) provid-
ing for enforcement of judgments from other jurisdictions, (5) 
promoting cross-jurisdictional arbitration and enforcement of 
arbitration awards, and (6) harmonizing some areas of the law 
(for example, disclosure rules) while allowing jurisdictional 
competition in other areas (for example, substantive rules gov-
erning fiduciary obligations of business managers).53
Most coordination efforts are likely to experience the same 
political and other impediments that face harmonization ef-
forts, although to a lesser degree when coordination focuses on-
ly on isolated issues and jurisdictions otherwise have autonomy 
in determining their own rules. Nonetheless, for policy makers 
worried that unrestrained jurisdictional competition can lead to 
a “race to the bottom” and impose externalities or unwanted 
costs on persons other than the parties to transactions, some 
form of coordination may be an attractive alternative. Some 
E.U. directives allow individual Member States enough flexibil-
ity to be characterized as coordination rather than harmoniza-
tion, and this approach often emerges when efforts to harmo-
nize laws across the European Union are unsuccessful.
 
54 For 
example, Germany and other Member States rejected the Eu-
ropean Union’s attempt in the early 2000s to impose the United 
Kingdom’s “strict neutrality rule,” barring directors from im-
plementing defenses to hostile takeovers without shareholder 
consent, after harsh criticism by German industry and academ-
ic commentators who feared an uneven playing field favoring 
foreign bidders.55
 
 53. Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 
 As a result, a revised E.U. takeover directive 
15, at 161–63. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, European 
Takeover Law: Towards a European Modified Business Judgment Rule for 
Takeover Law, 1 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 353 (2000) (criticizing the strict neu-
trality rule in Article 9(1)(a) of the proposed directive); Richard W. Painter, 
Don’t Disadvantage Europe: The European Parliament Made the Right Call in 
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allowed Member States to opt out of the strict neutrality rule 
and permit board initiated takeover defenses.56
C. BIFURCATED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN SECURITIES 
LAW 
  
Jurisdictional competition could follow a different trajecto-
ry in private litigation than it does in government enforcement 
actions. Private suits could be permitted in some jurisdictions 
but not in others, and among jurisdictions that allow private 
suits, some might be more willing to apply their law extraterri-
torially than others. Government enforcement could be more 
robust in some jurisdictions than in others, and some jurisdic-
tions may be more aggressive than others in extending gov-
ernment enforcement beyond their borders.  
Private litigation and government enforcement thus could 
respond differently to the same fundamental problem: the diffi-
culty of confining effects of regulation to defined geographic 
boundaries. As Chris Brummer points out in his book Soft Law 
and the Global Financial System, “[h]ow geographic borders are 
defined for regulatory purposes is not always a straightforward 
matter” and “[b]y operating as a gateway to investors, consum-
ers, and capital, territoriality can be leveraged in a way that 
can affect foreign firms (at a minimum those operating in the 
country) and, potentially, the conduct or approach by foreign 
regulators . . . .”57
 
Rejecting the Strict Neutrality Rule, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 19, 2001, at 9 (crit-
icizing the proposed E.U. corporate takeover directive rejected by the E.U. 
Parliament). 
 Defined geographic borders for securities 
transactions—the overarching assumption behind the Morrison 
decision—are an unstable basis for limiting the extraterritorial 
reach of both private litigation and government regulation. 
Courts adjudicating private lawsuits may deal with the prob-
lem one way, for example, by developing a jurisprudence that 
defines as best it can when a transaction is within certain 
boundaries or, alternatively, by honoring parties’ choice of law. 
Government regulators, on the other hand, may focus on other 
criteria such as whether the conduct occurs within their bor-
ders or the effects of certain conduct within their borders; they 
may do so through coordination with other jurisdictions or uni-
 56. See Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, 2004 O.J. (L142) art. 12 (setting forth “optional arrangements” allow-
ing Member States not to require companies with registered offices within its 
territory to comply with the strict neutrality rule in Article 9). 
 57. BRUMMER, supra note 45, at 34–35. 
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laterally, provoking possible confrontation with regulators in 
other jurisdictions.  
Bifurcated jurisdictional competition will characterize 
global securities litigation after Morrison because some juris-
dictions recognize private rights of action whereas others do 
not, and some jurisdictions such as the United States have 
sought to extend government enforcement actions extraterrito-
rially in situations where private lawsuits would not be permit-
ted.58
The Morrison decision has not affected government en-
forcement of U.S. securities law as much as civil litigation. 
First, Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act reinstates for SEC 
suits and DOJ criminal prosecutions the conduct and effects 
tests
  
59 that prevailed before Morrison. Second, at least one 
court has held that “offers” of securities inside the United 
States are covered by Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, 
even if there is no transaction giving rise to other securities law 
claims, such as under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.60
Against this background, other countries may still compete 
with the United States to design better legal rules and en-
forcement regimes to attract securities transactions within 
their borders, but they must do so knowing that there still 
could be intervention by the SEC or DOJ. The extraterritorial 
reach of SEC or DOJ actions can be implicated if there is an 
“offer” in the United States or if the U.S. conduct component is 
sufficient to allow a suit under Section 929P. A U.S. enforce-
ment overlay, for example, might occur if information is misap-
 The SEC 
or DOJ under this theory can bring an action over the illegal 
“offer” even though the actual sale took place somewhere else. 
 
 58. Bifurcated jurisdictional competition could be limited to government 
enforcement in countries, such as Germany, that emphasize public law en-
forcement over private rights of action.  
 59. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). There is some debate about whether Section 
929P does, in fact, change the substantive reach of the securities laws in SEC 
and DOJ cases or whether its express language merely confers jurisdiction on 
federal courts to hear these cases. See Richard W. Painter et al., When Courts 
and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. Na-
tional Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–5, 14–25 (2011); Painter, Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 205–08. 
 60. See SEC v. Tourre, No. 10-Civ.-3229(BSJ)(MHD), 2011 WL 1458545 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2011).  
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propriated in the United States for insider trading in a non-
U.S. market.61
Civil litigation under U.S. securities laws, on the other 
hand, has been substantially changed because after Morrison 
plaintiffs must now satisfy Justice Scalia’s “transactional test” 
and show that they bought or sold in a transaction within the 
borders of the United States in order to sue.
  
62
This bifurcated jurisdictional competition—with SEC and 
DOJ enforcement going in one direction and civil litigation in 
another—poses some unique challenges. Even if the parties to a 
transaction can choose to remove their transaction from the 
United States and, thereby, opt into the law of another jurisdic-
tion, the possibility remains that the SEC or DOJ could follow 
them. A party to a disputed transaction outside the United 
States can even reintroduce U.S. law into the civil liability re-
gime by threatening to involve the SEC or DOJ if the other par-
ty does not offer an attractive settlement. Uncertainty about 
the significance of such a threat can cast a long shadow over 
the civil liability regime.  
 A person trading 
contemporaneously with an insider trader on a non-U.S. mar-
ket would have no cause of action under U.S. law, even if Sec-
tion 929P gave the SEC and the DOJ the power to pursue the 
perpetrator. 
Nonetheless, Section 929P does not restore private rights 
of action. The Dodd-Frank Act ordered an SEC study on this 
topic,63
One advantage of bifurcated jurisdictional competition is 
that the SEC and DOJ enforcement regimes can be a backstop 
 but the chances are slim that Congress will restore pri-
vate rights of action under the conduct and effects tests. The 
most powerful weapon in plaintiffs’ arsenal, the fraud-on-the-
market theory in class actions, is thus thwarted in those in-
stances where transactions are outside the United States. The 
fact that an SEC action is still possible may change the settle-
ment value of a foreign lawsuit, but not as much as if there 
were also the potential for a private class action under the in-
determinate Second Circuit case law that preceded Morrison.  
 
 61. See Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 216–17. 
 62. Morrison ruled on Section 10b of the 1934 Act but the ruling probably 
extends to all private rights of action under the federal securities laws. 
 63. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON THE 
CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 
10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf. 
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against a race to the bottom in the civil liability arena. The ar-
gument for allowing choice of law freedom for transacting par-
ties is more persuasive when bad choices by contracting par-
ties—such as moving securities transactions offshore to 
regimes with little or no regulation—do not thwart enforcement 
action by government authorities. Proponents of the race to the 
bottom theory will have a less compelling argument against al-
lowing contractual freedom than they would if the parties’ 
choice of legal regime allowed them to opt out of SEC and DOJ 
enforcement as well as civil liability.  
In sum, jurisdictional competition in securities regulation 
may be mixed with efforts to harmonize the law in different ju-
risdictions and, where harmonization is not possible or practi-
cal, efforts to coordinate the law of different jurisdictions. Pri-
vate securities litigation may proceed along one trajectory 
while government enforcement proceeds along another. In some 
instances, jurisdictions will engage in Choice of Law Competi-
tion, allowing transacting parties to choose a legal regime for 
their transactions, and in other instances jurisdictions will en-
gage in Forum Competition, allowing private plaintiffs access 
to their courts. Some jurisdictions may also engage in govern-
ment-enforcement-oriented Forum Competition in which courts 
and other government agencies are used to facilitate enforce-
ment initiatives reaching across geographic boundaries.  
II.  FORUM COMPETITION AFTER MORRISON   
It is possible that other jurisdictions will follow the United 
States in accepting the basic premise of Morrison and then de-
sign rules and adjudication procedures that apply only to secu-
rities transactions within the geographic boundaries of the ju-
risdiction. Although, as explained above, it would be difficult to 
identify the location of some transactions, most transactions 
would be subject only to the law of one jurisdiction. Jurisdic-
tions also might use coordination or some other strategy to 
agree upon rules for determining the “transaction location” of 
private sales of securities, security-based swaps, and other 
transactions that do not take place on organized exchanges.  
In this type of jurisdictional competition, the focus would 
be on Choice of Law Competition as jurisdictions compete to 
design laws and procedures that make transacting parties want 
to locate transactions in their jurisdictions. Securities exchang-
es and other intermediaries would presumably play a signifi-
cant role in designing legal regimes with this end in mind. The 
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“race to the top” versus “race to the bottom” debate is central to 
assessing the qualitative outcome of this type of jurisdictional 
competition. 
Forum Competition, however, could evolve quite differently 
if one or more countries seek to do what the United States did 
before Morrison—and what Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank 
Act still allows the United States to do in SEC and DOJ ac-
tions—and superimpose their law on securities transactions 
outside their geographic borders. If plaintiffs’ lawyers and oth-
er interest groups that benefit from securities litigation find a 
way to influence the relevant jurisdiction to apply securities 
law extraterritorially, such a “race to extraterritoriality” can be 
expected.64
Several factors may, over time, increase Forum Competi-
tion between the United States and Europe. One factor is the 
proliferation of “piggyback” suits. Piggyback suits are lawsuits 
that plaintiffs bring in one jurisdiction after unsuccessful 
suits—or suits in which plaintiffs have only limited success—in 
another jurisdiction.
 Even though the United States in Morrison unilat-
erally withdrew from this race to extraterritoriality in the civil 
litigation arena, this does not mean that other countries will 
also stand down.  
65 European piggyback suits can be based 
on suits pending in U.S. courts that are dismissed under Morri-
son as well as upon suits that are allowed to proceed in the 
United States.66 These piggyback suits may be encouraged by a 
judicial trend allowing the enforcement of U.S. class action set-
tlements in the Netherlands.67 There is some evidence that 
Dutch and other European courts could expand their extrater-
ritorial reach beyond the enforcement of settlements to cover 
cases being litigated as class actions.68
 
 64. The plaintiffs’ bar in the United States and its supporters in Congress 
sought to legislatively preempt the holding in Morrison with legislation draft-
ed before Morrison was decided, but Congress adopted a compromise position 
in Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act simply mandating an SEC study of 
whether an extraterritorial private right of action should be created. For dis-
cussion of the Dodd-Frank provisions, see Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 
 American piggyback 
suits could be lawsuits brought by the SEC and the DOJ under 
Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act “for conduct occurring 
outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial ef-
11, at 199. 
 65. See infra Part II.B.2.a–b (describing the Fortis and Converium cases). 
 66. See infra Part II.B.2.a–b (describing the Fortis and Converium cases). 
 67. See infra text accompanying notes 182–84 & 204–10. 
 68. See infra Part II.B.3 (describing the World Online case).  
  
2012] COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LAW 155 
 
fect in the United States.”69
An important factor in Forum Competition is the existence 
of procedural rules that increase or decrease the size of the 
class in a class action or other collective procedure. Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers often prefer larger classes because they result in larger 
settlements; defendants’ lawyers sometimes seek to limit the 
size of the plaintiff classes, although they may prefer larger 
classes in settlements. Most of the collective procedures for 
class actions in Europe allow for an opt-in procedure but pro-
hibit or curtail procedures that require plaintiffs to opt-out of a 
suit.
 In these situations, the SEC or 
DOJ would “piggyback” on civil litigation or enforcement efforts 
in Europe or elsewhere outside the United States. 
70 Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will 
likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts. 
This could impact settlement amounts and damages awards.71
The Netherlands has adopted both opt-in and opt-out 
mechanisms. The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of 
Mass Claims (WCAM)
 
The smaller class size of European collective procedures for se-
curities actions could limit the number and impact of European 
suits.  
72 allows the parties to a settlement 
agreement to request the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to de-
clare the settlement agreement binding on all persons involved 
in the action.73 Compared to other European collective proce-
dures, the WCAM comes closest to U.S. class actions in provid-
ing an opt-out mechanism with regard to settlements.74
 
 69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 By con-
 70. See sources cited infra note 224.  
 71. Another factor is that punitive damages are rarely awarded in Europe.  
 72. Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade [WCAM] [Collective Set-
tlement of Mass Claims], Stb. 2005, p. 340 (Neth.), available at http://www 
.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf; Legal Alert 
Converium, supra note 34.  
 73. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 74. Eberhard Feess & Axel Halfmeier, The German Capital Markets 
Model Case Act (KapMuG)—A European Role Model for Increasing the Effi-
ciency of Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform 14 (January 
2012), (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1684528 (“Thereby, a two step notification process is adopted where the first 
notification refers to class members already known, and the second one to un-
known class members by means of public communications. After the settle-
ment is approved, the court determines a period of at least 3 months for per-
sons who want to opt out because they prefer to proceed with individual 
claims.”).  
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trast, the German Act on Model Procedures for Mass Claims in 
Capital Markets Cases (KapMuG)75 does not provide an opt-out 
mechanism.76 Sweden’s Group Proceedings Act (GPA)77 also 
prohibits an opt-out procedure; each member of a class must 
individually opt into the class. In 2008, however, Denmark in-
troduced an opt-out option for group actions involving small in-
dividual claims.78
Yet another issue is how the United States and Europe will 
address situations where the geographic location of a transac-
tion is ambiguous. These include securities that are listed on 
securities exchanges in two or more jurisdictions (dual-listed 
securities),
 
79 securities-based swap agreements entered into by 
parties in one jurisdiction that reference a security traded in 
another jurisdiction,80
 
 75. Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Market 
Investors’ Model Proceeding Act], Aug. 16, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I 
[BGBL. I] at 2437 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
bundesrecht/kapmug/gesamt.pdf. 
 and private transactions that are de-
 76. It is unclear if reform efforts will result in an increasing or broader 
application of the KapMuG. See Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Kapi-
talanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSA-
CHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT] 17/8799 (Ger.), available at http://dipbt 
.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/087/1708799.pdf; Referentenentwurf des Bundes-
ministeriums der Justiz: Gesetz zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetzes, July 21, 2011 (Ger.), available at http://www.bmj 
.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/RefE_KapMuG.pdf?__blob=publicationFil
e; Stellungnahme des Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverbandes zum Gesetze-
sentwurf der Bundesregierung für ein Gesetz zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetzes, Apr. 20, 2012 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a06/anhoerungen/archiv/ 
20_KapMug/04_Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Westphal.pdf; AXEL HALF-
MEIER ET AL., ABSCHLUSSBERICHT: EVALUATION DES KAPITALANLEGER-
MUSTERVERFAHRENSGESETZES (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://www.bmj.de/ 
SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/Abschlussbericht_KapMuG_Frankfurt% 
20School_2009.pdf?__blob=publicationFile; Press Release, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Experten uneinig über Zukunft von KapMuG und Musterver-
fahren, (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/2012_04/2012_ 
209/02.html.  
 77. LAG OM GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 
2002:599) [Group Proceedings Act] (Swed.), available at http://www.sweden 
.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/77/67/bcbe1f4f.pdf.  
 78. Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 74, at 16. 
 79. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512,  
528–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Section 10(b) does not apply to dual-
listed securities where the purchase and sale did not arise from the domestic 
listing).  
 80. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 
469, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that Section 10(b) does not apply to secu-
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signed and marketed from one jurisdiction but executed in an-
other jurisdiction.81 In cases involving these situations plain-
tiffs and defendants will sometimes have sharp differences over 
the geographic location of transactions. It is not at all certain 
that U.S. courts will predictably apply the geographic test in 
Morrison to these types of transactions.82
Finally, non-U.S. jurisdictions could choose to split off gov-
ernment enforcement from civil litigation as the United States 
did in Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act.
 Furthermore, non-
U.S. courts may apply a geographic test differently than the 
U.S. case law. Non-U.S. courts could also respond to ambiguous 
geography by rejecting geographic tests and resorting to a vari-
ation of the conduct and effects tests, or a similar “balancing” 
formula. It is possible that both U.S. courts and courts of one or 
more foreign countries could consider a transaction as taking 
place within their individual borders. Alternatively, defendants 
might successfully persuade courts in all jurisdictions that a 
transaction took place outside their borders or for some other 
reason outside their jurisdictions. Such a “no man’s land” 
transaction would be governed by no law and there would be no 
forum.  
83
 
rities-based swap agreements executed in the United States that reference 
foreign-traded securities). 
 Bifurcated juris-
dictional competition thus could lead some jurisdictions to ex-
ercise enforcement powers over a transaction that is subject to 
civil litigation in only one, or perhaps none, of these jurisdic-
tions. Misappropriation of confidential information in the Unit-
ed States for trading in German securities markets, for exam-
ple, might give rise to a Section 929P(a) SEC enforcement 
action or DOJ insider trading prosecution. At the same time, 
such conduct could be subject to civil litigation or an insider 
trading prosecution in Germany. If the misappropriated infor-
mation originated in Italy, for example, Italian enforcement au-
 81. See, e.g., SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150–51 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Section 10(b) does not apply to securities mar-
keted in the United States but sold in another country). 
 82. See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche, 1 EUR. COMPANY & 
FIN. L. REV. 77, 80–92 (2011) (discussing open questions and ambiguities re-
lated to Morrison’s geography test).  
 83. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (allowing SEC civil enforcement against some 
violations of federal securities law in some transactions outside the United 
States). 
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thorities could become involved as well. A difficult situation 
could arise if the underlying facts constituted illegal insider 
trading under U.S. law but did not violate the insider trading 
laws of Italy or Germany. In that situation, the fact that the in-
formation—but not the securities—passed through the United 
States might be sufficient to support a U.S. criminal prosecu-
tion for securities fraud. Civil suits and government enforce-
ment would, however, be unlikely to occur in Italy and Germa-
ny because the conduct was not illegal in those countries.  
Extraterritorial enforcement, however, is a game that sev-
eral countries can play. One or more jurisdictions might enforce 
their own laws against transactions in U.S. securities markets 
that are legal under U.S. law but illegal under the laws of an-
other jurisdiction (some forms of short selling might be an ex-
ample). Criminal prosecution for the U.S. transactions could 
ensue if the jurisdiction where the conduct is illegal has an ex-
traterritorial enforcement provision similar to Section 929P of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.84
This paper speculates about a few of the many possible 
evolutionary paths for global securities law after Morrison. 
Although a few patterns are emerging, particularly in the 
Netherlands, it remains to be seen how European law will re-
spond to the prospect of increased jurisdictional competition af-
ter Morrison, and whether the law of one or more European 
countries will consistently reach transactions elsewhere. Other 
regions besides Europe are outside the scope of this article, alt-
hough we briefly discuss developments in Canada because 
some securities litigation may move from the United States to 
Canada after Morrison.
 Foreign governments could thus regulate 
activity in U.S. markets, forcing some participants in those 
markets to play by their rules. Other non-U.S. jurisdictions 
might go even further and allow civil suits based on conduct in 
U.S. markets.  
85
 
 84. See id. § 929P(b) (providing jurisdiction for extraterritorial violations 
of the antifraud provisions of federal securities laws where conduct within the 
United States significantly furthered the violation or where extraterritorial 
conduct had a substantial effect within the United States). 
 These and other jurisdictions may join 
 85. There is some evidence that Canada may continue to increase its at-
tractiveness for U.S. class action litigants. For example, Vivendi plaintiffs’ 
lawyer Michael Spencer, who practices in New York, has joined the Canadian 
bar. According to Mr. Spencer, “[s]imply put, Canada presents a great oppor-
tunity.” Sandra Rubin, Top U.S. Class-Action Lawyer Coming to Canada, 
GLOBE & MAIL (May 10, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on 
-business/industry-news/the-law-page/top-us-class-action-lawyer-coming-to 
-canada/article580187; see Tanya Monestier, Is Canada the New “Shangri-La” 
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in the jurisdictional competition, seeking to attract either secu-
rities transactions or securities litigation or both within their 
borders. It also remains to be seen how far the SEC and DOJ 
will go with Section 929P, and whether other jurisdictions will 
adopt a similar approach to extraterritorial enforcement. 
A. THE PROLIFERATION OF EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE 
PROCEDURES 
Jurisdictions involved in Forum Competition attract one or 
both of the parties to a transaction to choose that jurisdiction 
as a forum for litigation. The United States engaged in some 
Forum Competition for global securities litigation under the 
conduct and effects tests, but the Morrison decision considera-
bly narrowed the ability of the United States to provide a liti-
gation forum for parties to non-U.S. transactions. There are 
some indications that one or more European jurisdictions—
particularly the Netherlands—may provide some aspects of the 
type of global securities forum that the Morrison court decided 
would no longer be available in the United States.  
Forum Competition in private litigation depends in part 
upon procedural features that lawyers find attractive. Pro-
plaintiff substantive law is also an important factor. One fea-
ture of the U.S. legal system that attracts lawyers is that liti-
gants pay their own lawyers’ fees, whereas European cases, in-
cluding collective procedures on behalf of multiple plaintiffs, 
are usually governed by a “loser-pays” rule in which unsuccess-
ful plaintiffs are responsible for successful defendants’ legal 
fees. Another distinguishing procedural feature that makes the 
United States attractive is the relative ease of class certifica-
tion in class actions. The United States also allows certification 
of “opt-out” classes in which individual class members must af-
firmatively opt-out of the class in order not to be bound by a 
 
of Global Securities Class Actions?, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1929090; see also Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 25, at 892; Mi-
chael D. Goldhaber, Global Class Actions After Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, AM. LAW (Feb. 6, 2012), http://americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL 
.jsp?id=1202541502514 (“The two leading candidates [for filing global class 
actions] are Canada and [t]he Netherlands.”); Kevin LaCroix, Canadian Secu-
rities Class Action Lawsuit Filings Hit Record in 2011, D & O DIARY (Feb. 2, 
2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/02/articles/securities-litigation/ 
Canadian-securities-class-action-lawsuit-filings-hit-record-in-2011. But see 
Knutsen, supra note 25, at 153–55 (arguing that Ontario’s new securities leg-
islation makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring successful securities class 
actions). 
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judgment or settlement of the action. European collective pro-
cedures approximate U.S. class actions in some ways but, as 
discussed below, in other ways they fall short. 
With respect to substantive law, one of the most attractive 
features of U.S. securities litigation is the fraud-on-the-market 
theory. This theory allows plaintiffs to show that they relied on 
a market that was misled by defendants’ misrepresentations 
instead of showing individual reliance by each plaintiff on the 
defendants’ misrepresentations.86 The alternative approach, 
adhered to in most other jurisdictions including in Europe, is to 
require each plaintiff to show individual reliance on the de-
fendants’ misrepresentations. This difference in substantive 
law has an impact on procedural issues because class action lit-
igation and collective procedures are easier if plaintiffs in the 
class share common questions of law and fact. Common issues 
are more predominant if the plaintiffs can succeed by showing 
that they all relied upon the same market rather than individ-
ual reliance on the defendants’ misrepresentations.87
Class action filings in the United States remain robust, de-
spite efforts by both Congress and the federal courts to tighten 
the requirements for plaintiffs.
  
88
 
 86. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).  
 In recent years, some Europe-
an jurisdictions have adjusted their laws, allowing for a type of 
collective procedure that is similar to a U.S. securities class ac-
 87. See id. at 242, 245 (“Requiring proof of individualized reliance . . . 
would have prevented . . . a class action, since individual issues then would 
have overwhelmed the common ones.”). 
 88. See Securities Class Action Filings: 2011 Year in Review, CORNER-
STONE RESEARCH, 3–5 (2012), http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_ 
research/2011_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2011_YIR.pdf. There are 
varying explanations for the number of suits in the United States, including 
the large number of financial frauds in the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, the significant investor losses in financial markets, and the fact that de-
spite anti-plaintiff legislation and case law, the United States is still more fa-
vorable to plaintiffs, and their lawyers, than many other jurisdictions. Anti-
plaintiff legislation in the United States includes the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amend-
ed in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), and anti-plaintiff case law includes a se-
ries of cases rejecting Section 10(b) liability for aiding and abetting securities 
fraud and for conspiring to commit securities fraud. See Stoneridge Inv. Part-
ners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 160–61 (2008) (holding that conduct in 
furtherance of a “scheme” of misrepresentation is not a basis for Section 10(b) 
liability if the misrepresentation was not disclosed to the public); Cent. Bank 
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (rejecting aiding 
and abetting as a basis for Section 10(b) liability). 
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tion.89 Following these developments, in 2007 the London-based 
law firm Lovells LLP (now Hogan Lovells due to a 2010 mer-
ger) created a practice group focused on class actions in Eu-
rope.90 However, only some European countries, including the 
United Kingdom, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the 
Netherlands, and Germany, have instituted a mass-claim pro-
cedure.91
Most importantly, with the notable exception of the Neth-
erlands,
  
92
 
 89. See infra notes 
 European jurisdictions thus far have not been recep-
tive to the fraud-on-the-market theory in securities litigation, 
meaning that—unlike in the United States—each plaintiff in a 
suit usually must show individual reliance on defendants’ al-
leged misrepresentations, a requirement that would make cer-
94–108 and accompanying text (discussing European 
collective procedures).  
 90. See Werner R. Kranenburg, Lovells Dispute Lawyers Focus on Class 
Actions, WITH VIGOUR & ZEAL: A EUROPEAN’S VIEWS ON SEC. LITIG. (Sept. 26, 
2007, 2:29 AM), http://kranenburgesq.com/blog/2007/09/lovells-dispute-lawyers 
-focus-on-class-actions (“The formation of the Class Actions Unit comes at a 
time when a number of continental European jurisdictions have implemented 
or are considering legislation to introduce new group litigation procedures.”); 
see also Examples of U.S. Legal Community Interest in Europe, INST. FOR  
LEGAL REFORM, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www 
.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/ 
international/examplesofuslegalcommunityinterestineuroperev.pdf (“Several 
of the most aggressive U.S. class action law firms are setting up offices in Eu-
rope, taking advantage of proposed class action laws at the EU and member 
state levels.”); Aviva Freudmann, United We Stand, CORP. SEC’Y: GOVERN-
ANCE, RISK & COMPLIANCE (May 1, 2007), http://www.corporatesecretary 
.com/articles/case-studies/11756/united-we-stand (“To capitalize on the chang-
es in European legislation governing class action lawsuits and litigation fund-
ing, several US law firms have set up European offices or established partner-
ships with European firms. In some cases, the firms are seeking European 
plaintiffs to join existing US class actions, particularly in securities cases.”); 
Alexia Garamfalvi, U.S. Firms Prepare for European Class Actions: As Europe 
Becomes More Friendly to Private Suits, U.S. Law Firms Look to Capitalize on 
Emerging Market, LAW.COM (June 25, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article 
.jsp?id=900005555895 (describing a law firm’s expectation that the class ac-
tion market will significantly expand in Europe based on legal changes in sev-
eral European countries, and due to the European Commission's interest in 
private enforcement of competition law); Brendan Malkin, UK Firms Gear Up 
as Class Action Culture Hits Europe, THE LAWYER (Feb. 7, 2005), 
http://www.thelawyer.com/uk-firms-gear-up-as-class-action-culture-hits 
-europe/113914.article (discussing an American law firm’s plans to launch se-
curities class actions in Germany, Italy, and Poland after rule changes are 
passed).  
 91. Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 74, at 13–14.  
 92. See infra Part III.B (discussing the promise of securities class actions 
in the Netherlands).  
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tification of a class or a similar procedure difficult.93
There are some signs that European law could be moving 
in this direction, although thus far there is no genuine Europe-
an substitute for the U.S. securities class action under the 
fraud-on-the-market theory. In 2005, the German legislature 
introduced a collective procedure for securities actions, the 
German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG).
 If, howev-
er, European jurisdictions dispense with the reliance require-
ment or develop some other mechanism for circumventing its 
debilitating effect on class actions, European class actions could 
begin to look much more like their U.S. counterparts.  
94 In the 
Netherlands, the Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of 
Mass Claims (WCAM) was enacted on July 27, 2005.95 Sweden, 
in 2002, adopted the Group Proceedings Act (GPA).96 Other 
Scandinavian countries, such as Norway and Denmark, fol-
lowed the Swedish model with some alterations.97 Similarly, 
the Italian legislature in 2009 introduced a proposal for a col-
lective procedure in securities actions.98
 
 93. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (“Requiring [individual 
reliance] . . . would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on 
the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff.”). 
 The introduction of Eu-
ropean collective procedures, in conjunction with institutional 
investors’ growing interest in such collective actions in Europe-
 94. KapMuG, Aug. 16, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 
2437 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/ 
kapmug/gesamt.pdf. The KapMuG is applicable in proceedings before a court 
of the first instance in which claimants assert: (1) claims for compensation of 
damages due to false, misleading or omitted public capital markets infor-
mation, or (2) claims for specific performance of a contract based on an offer 
under the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. See id. at 2437, § 1(1). 
 95. WCAM, Stb. 2005, p. 340 (Neth.), available at http://www.eerstekamer 
.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf. 
 96. LAG OM GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 
2002:599) [Group Proceedings Act] (Swed.), available at http://www.sweden 
.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/77/67/bcbe1f4f.pdf.  
 97. LOV OM MEKLING OG RETTERGANG I SIVILE TVISTER [Act Relating to 
Mediation and Procedure in Civil Disputes], June 17, 2005, no. 90 (Nor.), 
available at http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-20050617-090.html; LOV OM 
ÆNDRING AF RETSPLEJELOVEN OG FORSKELLIGE ANDRE LOVE (Gruppesøgsmål 
m.v.), Feb. 28, 2007, no. 181 (Den.), available at https://www.retsinformation 
.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=2593. 
 98. Legge 23 Luglio 2009, n. 99, art. 49 (It.), available at 
http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/09099l.htm. The final draft went into 
effect in January 2010. See also Cesare Cavallini, Azione collettiva risarcitoria 
e controversie finanziarie, 2010 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 1, 6.  
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an states, and an increasing availability of litigation funding,99
European collective procedures for securities actions could 
give institutional investors a greater opportunity to participate 
in securities litigation if they are so inclined, or feel compelled 
to participate in order to comply with their fiduciary duties. For 
instance, under the German KapMuG,
 
could, over time, make it more likely that collective procedures 
in Europe become an attractive alternative for plaintiffs’ law-
yers. Some of the cases they bring might involve non-European 
plaintiffs and defendants, as well as securities transactions 
taking place outside of Europe (the types of cases that in the 
United States prior to Morrison were referred to as “foreign 
cubed cases,” meaning that neither of the parties, nor the secu-
rities transaction, was within the United States).  
100 plaintiffs and defend-
ants in Germany can file an application with the trial court to 
establish a model case proceeding.101 Its purpose is to establish 
the existence and validity of a claim and clarify the legal ques-
tions pertaining thereto.102 The opt-in procedure under the 
KapMuG provides that the higher regional court will open a 
model case proceeding and select a lead plaintiff if, within four 
months, at least ten applications for a model case proceeding 
are filed in similar cases against the same defendant.103 Proce-
durally, the higher regional court is charged with the responsi-
bility of finding one case among the ten applications that ap-
propriately illustrates the factual and legal questions at issue 
and must then hand down a judgment on the legal issues.104
 
 99. See Werner R. Kranenburg, What’s More: KapMuG, Lovells’ Class Ac-
tions, WITH VIGOUR & ZEAL: A EUROPEAN’S VIEWS ON SEC. LITIG. (Oct. 11, 
2007, 11:52 PM), http://kranenburgesq.com/blog/2007/10/whats-more-kapmug 
-lovells-class-actions. 
 
Rather than deciding all of the cases involving the same de-
fendant, at that point, procedurally, the high court’s decision 
becomes binding law for the trial courts in similar cases, and 
the trial courts must apply the new rule to the remaining pend-
 100. KapMuG, Aug. 16, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 
2437 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/ 
kapmug/gesamt.pdf. 
 101. BURKHARD HESS ET AL., KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM KAPMUG (Mathias 
Casper et al., eds., 2008).  
 102. Id.  
 103. Mark C. Milgard & Jan Kraayvanger, Class Actions and Mass Actions 
in Germany, LITIG. COMM. NEWSL. (Int’l Bar Ass’n Legal Practice Div., Lon-
don), Sept. 2007, at 40, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/ 
Class_Actions_Mass_Actions_Germany.pdf.  
 104. See id.  
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ing cases in the same matter individually. The KapMuG, how-
ever, does not discharge the trial judges from addressing the 
legal issues in each and every case individually. Despite an 
administratively burdensome process, the KapMuG does have 
some advantages. For instance, the statute of limitation does 
not start running for claimants in the same matter who have 
not yet opted into the class. While the test case is litigated, the 
other proceedings in the same matter against the same defend-
ant are stayed. The KapMuG’s features seem to have encour-
aged several institutional investors, including non-German in-
stitutional investors, to file cases against Daimler AG,105
Sweden’s GPA allows natural or legal persons to initiate 
collective proceedings. Like the Dutch WCAM and the German 
KapMuG, the GPA requires group members to share similar in-
terests pertaining to the action as the lead plaintiff.
 the 
first case brought under the KapMuG.  
106 The GPA 
includes an opt-in procedure and the ruling is only legally bind-
ing for members of the class who did in fact opt-in and the lead 
plaintiff alone is party to the court proceeding.107 Similar to 
contingent-fee arrangements in the United States, the GPA in-
troduces risk agreements that allow attorneys to charge fees 
conditional on their success in the suit. The reluctance of Swe-
dish attorneys to work within such an arrangement could per-
haps be one reason for the lack of group actions in Sweden.108
So far, the German KapMuG seems to be the only coherent 
attempt at establishing a procedure to address collective-
securities claims. Another jurisdiction that may develop law to 
facilitate collective procedures is the Netherlands.  
  
 
 105. See Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart [OLG] [Stuttgart Higher Regional 
Court] Feb. 2, 2007, 901 Kap 1/06 (Ger.), available at http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-
bin/laender_rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bw&Art=en&GerichtAusw
ahl=OLG+Stuttgart&az=901; Press Release, Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart, 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren gegen DaimlerChrysler AG vor dem 
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (July 13, 2006), http://www.olg-stuttgart.de/ 
servlet/PB/menu/1200878/index.html; Press Release, Oberlandesgerichts 
Stuttgart, Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart Entscheidet im Kapitalanlegermuster 
verfahren zu Gunsten der Daimler AG (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.olg 
-stuttgart.de/servlet/PB/menu/1241538/indx.html.  
 106. See Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 74, at 15.  
 107. See id. This minimizes transaction costs in accordance with the U.S. 
model. The KapMuG does not allow lead plaintiffs per se. KapMuG, Aug. 16, 
2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 2437 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/kapmug/gesamt.pdf. 
 108. See Feess & Halfmeier, supra note 74, at 16 (“Swedish attorneys are 
traditionally very reluctant to work on a contingency fee basis.”).  
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B. THE NETHERLANDS AS A FORUM FOR MULTI-NATIONAL 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS  
To compete with the United States in the aftermath of the 
Morrison decision, procedural and substantive rules in the 
Netherlands no longer need to be as attractive to non-U.S. 
transaction plaintiffs as when these plaintiffs had the option of 
suing in the United States (under Morrison, plaintiffs suing 
over securities transactions outside the United States can no 
longer sue under Section 10(b),109
The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims 
(WCAM),
 and for other reasons plain-
tiffs may not be successful suing under state law or under non-
U.S. law in U.S. courts). To attract plaintiffs in non-U.S. trans-
actions, the Netherlands only has to compete with other juris-
dictions that will entertain the same suits. If the Netherlands 
also seeks to attract parties to U.S. transactions as plaintiffs, 
the Netherlands will have to provide some litigation features 
that are comparable to what is available in the United States.  
110
1. The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims  
 discussed below, as well as the Fortis and 
Converium cases, also discussed below, illustrate how influen-
tial the Dutch securities litigation regime could become.  
As discussed above, one or more jurisdictions could offer 
Forum Competition separate from the operative law which 
could be that of a different jurisdiction.111
The Netherlands is probably Europe’s most successful ven-
ue for enforcing foreign settlements. Other European countries 
are hesitant to allow a collective settlement in a mass litigation 
case to be binding on all class members.
 One context in which 
a jurisdiction’s courts could apply another jurisdiction’s law to 
securities transactions could be settlement agreements that are 
brought to a jurisdiction’s courts for approval and enforcement. 
112
 
 109. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881–83 (2010). 
 Dutch courts regu-
 110. WCAM, Stb. 2005, p. 340 (Neth.), available at http://www.eerstekamer 
.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf; see Burgerlijk Wetboek 
[BW] (Civil Code) art. 3:305a (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code, BRECHT, 
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodegeneral.htm (permitting a collective 
cause of action to “protect similar interests of other persons”); id. art. 7:907 
(listing requirements and limitations of damages awards in collective action 
suits). 
 111. See supra note 15. 
 112. See, e.g., HÉLÈNE VAN LITH, THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS 
ACT AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 127–28 (2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/saw_ 
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larly apply foreign law on the basis of the Rome I Regulations113 
and other international regulations.114 A decision by a Dutch 
court in this context is generally recognized in other European 
member states.115 The recognition and enforcement of class ac-
tion settlements in the Netherlands could foreshadow future 
developments in other areas of the law.116
An important reason for the Dutch success in this area is 
the Dutch WCAM.
  
117 The class-settlement procedures provided 
by the WCAM strongly resemble class action settlements in the 
United States.118
 
annex_en.pdf
 Similar to U.S.-style class actions, interested 
parties, i.e., parties to the settlement, do not have to opt-in in 
order to become a party to the settlement but they may opt-out 
 (discussing Germany’s reluctance to recognize opt-out class ac-
tion decisions); see generally Ruud Hermans & Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, 
International Class Action Settlements in the Netherlands Since Converium, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CLASS AND GROUP AC-
TIONS 2012, available at http://www.debrauw.com/sitecollectiondocuments/ 
CA12_de-brauw_ver3%202011.pdf (discussing class action settlements in the 
Netherlands and issues of enforceability in other European countries).  
 113. Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, available at http://eur-lex.europa 
.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:177:0006:0006:en:PDF; see also 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Conven-
tion), 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1980:266:0001:0010:EN:PDF. 
 114. Rob Polak & Ruud Hermans, International Class Action Settlements in 
the Netherlands After the Morrison and Ahold Decisions, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CLASS AND GROUP ACTIONS 2011, at 9.  
 115. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on Jurisdic-
tion and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters (Brussels I), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, available at http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:EN:PDF; 
VAN LITH, supra note 112, at 127–28; Tomas Arons & Willem H. van Boom, 
Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim Settlements from 
the Netherlands, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857, 876, 880–82; Hermans & de Bie 
Leuveling Tjeenk, supra note 112, ¶¶ 36–37; Legal Alert Converium, supra 
note 34. 
 116. Arons & van Boom, supra note 115, at 857, 875; Polak & Hermans, 
supra note 114, at 6; Michael Goldhaber, ‘Shell Model’ Opens Door to Europe-
an Class Actions, LAW.COM (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/ 
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1199700328427 (“[T]he Netherlands [is] becoming a mec-
ca for European class action settlements, in the way that Delaware has be-
come a destination for bankruptcy law.”). 
 117. WCAM, Stb. 2005, p. 340 (Neth.), available at http://www.eerstekamer 
.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf.  
 118. See Brechje van der Velden, Shell Non-U.S. Settlement Declared Bind-
ing by Dutch Court, ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.allenovery 
.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Shell-non-U-S--settlement-declared-binding-by 
-Dutch-court.aspx. 
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of the settlement.119 Unlike U.S. class action procedures, the 
WCAM does not provide a legal basis for bringing or maintain-
ing class actions seeking monetary damages.120 It merely pro-
vides procedures to settle claims between the defendants and a 
foundation representing the interests of the injured party.121 
The WCAM gives the Amsterdam Court of Appeal exclusive ju-
risdiction to certify settlements in WCAM cases.122 The court’s 
decision pertaining to a settlement is binding for the plaintiffs, 
and plaintiffs can only appeal the court’s decision in limited cir-
cumstances.123 The WCAM does not provide specific guidance 
on the distribution of proceeds or the calculation of damages.124 
However, an integral part of the settlement considerations is 
an evaluation of procedural and substantive fairness and the 
efficiency of the settlement.125 The WCAM, thus, avoids black-
mail settlements in which a defendant offers a payment to get 
out of a class action to avoid the prospect of endless proceedings 
and reputational loss in the process.126
2. Increasing Relevance of Dutch Courts  
 Given the procedural 
tools provided by the WCAM, the Act is an effective tool that 
multinational corporations can use to obtain global solutions 
for disputes involving multinational parties throughout the 
world.  
Since the introduction of the WCAM in 2005, settlements 
under the WCAM have ranged from capital markets and finan-
 
 119. Willem H. van Boom, Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in The 
Netherlands, in AUF DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPÄISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE? 178–
79 (Matthias Casper et al., eds., 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1456819. 
 120. Arjan de Boode & Allard Huizing, The Netherlands as an Alternative 
Forum for Cross Border Class Settlements and the Potential Consequences for 
Claims by ‘Foreign Cubed’ Plaintiffs Under U.S. Securities Laws, 
GREENBERGTRAURIG (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/ 
Publications/Alerts/132898/The-Netherlands-as-an-Alternative-Forum-for 
-Cross-Border-Class-Settlements-and-the-Potential-Consequences-for-Claims 
-by-Foreign-Cubed-Plaintiffs-under-US-Securities-Laws.  
 121. van Boom, supra note 119, at 178–79.  
 122. WCAM, Stb. 2005, p. 304, available at http://www.eerstekamer.nl/ 
9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vh22drdk4jr7/f=y.pdf; Wetboek van Burgerlijke 
Rechtsvordering [Rv] (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) art. 1013(3) (Neth.), trans-
lated in Code of Civil Procedure, BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/ 
civilprocedureleg.htm.  
 123. van Boom, supra note 119, at 179.  
 124. See de Boode & Huizing, supra note 120. 
 125. Id.  
 126. See id.  
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cial services cases to pharmaceutical liability suits.127 Cases in 
this context have involved personal injury,128 failure to warn 
about risks of retail investment products,129 bankruptcy of a life 
insurance company,130 and securities fraud.131
Shell was the first in a line of cases involving the enforce-
ment of international settlements in the Netherlands.
  
132 Shell 
was the first WCAM case with a substantial international 
scope.133 As a result of mass claims initiated in the United 
States, Shell entered into settlements regarding the re-
categorization and restatement of its oil and gas reserves.134 
The Shell settlement is noteworthy because investors from all 
over the world were involved.135 The fourteen securities class 
actions filed by investors in the United States were consolidat-
ed.136 However, the U.S. court also had to rule on claims 
brought by plaintiffs who were not American residents and had 
bought Shell stock on European stock exchanges.137 Before the 
American court issued a final ruling in which the court de-
clared its incompetence to hear the claims, Shell reached a set-
tlement with the non-U.S. investors under the WCAM.138
 
 127. See Ianika Tzankova & Daan L. Scheurleer, The Netherlands, 622 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 149, 155 (2009).  
 The 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, in a landmark decision on May 29, 
 128. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 (Farmaceutische 
bedrijven en verzekeraars enerzijds/Stichting DES Centrum) (Neth.). 
 129. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 25 januari 2007, JOR 2007, 71 (Stichting 
Leaseverlies/Dexia) (Neth.).  
 130. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 29 april 2009, JOR 2009, 196 (Stichting 
Pensioen-en Verzekeringskamer en Staat/Vie d’Or) (Neth.). 
 131. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 (VEB/Vedior) 
(Neth.) (pertaining to shareholder allegations of securities fraud related to 
merger and acquisition); Converium COA Decision, supra note 32 (addressing 
shareholder allegations of securities fraud related to failure to accurately dis-
close loss reserves). 
 132. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 197 (VEB/Shell) (Neth.); see 
also Polak & Hermans, supra note 114, at 6 (“[N]ow that ‘foreign cubed class 
actions’ have been made impossible in the United States . . . the Netherlands 
may be the place to certify a class action settlement involving non-US inves-
tors in non-US securities listed on a non-US stock exchange.”). 
 133. Polak & Hermans, supra note 114, at 7. 
 134. See Van der Velden, supra note 118.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. (“An important consideration of the court was, apart from the fact 
that the damaging facts had not taken place in the United States (the so-
called conduct test), that it was ‘significant’ that meanwhile an arrangement 
had been made for this group of investors under the Dutch WCAM.”).  
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2009, approved $381 million in settlement awards.139 The U.S. 
court, in declining to hear the case, emphasized that non-U.S. 
investors could rely on the Dutch WCAM to address alleged in-
juries.140 Similarly, the decision by an Amsterdam district court 
in Ahold141 on June 23, 2010 also involved a U.S. class action 
settled in the Netherlands.142 The Dutch court recognized the 
U.S. class action settlement and enforced it worldwide.143 The 
court in Ahold held that the U.S. system adequately safeguard-
ed the interests of the injured parties because investors belong-
ing to the class could opt-out of the collective settlement.144
Shell and Ahold are important decisions on the interna-
tional application of the WCAM, showing that Dutch courts 
may have jurisdiction over all interested parties, regardless of 
their respective domicile. The decisions in Fortis and 
Converium, discussed below, illustrate that claims under Dutch 
law will likely increase and the jurisdiction of Dutch courts will 
likely expand. 
  
a. Fortis  
Copeland v. Fortis,145
 
 139. See Ben Hallman, Dutch Court Approves Landmark Royal Dutch Shell 
Shareholder ‘Class Action,’ AM. LAW., http://www.americanlawyer.com/ 
digestTAL.jsp?id=1202431087599&slreturn=20120807141744; see also Legal 
Alert, Shell: Landmark Decision Regarding International Collective Settlement 
of Mass Claims, DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK, 3 (June 2, 2009), 
http://www.debrauw.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legal%20Alerts/Litigation
%20Arbitration/Legal%20Alert%20Shell.pdf (“[S]ome connection with the 
Netherlands appears to be required in any event, for example: the presence of 
some interested persons in the Netherlands and one or more Dutch petition-
ers, such as the foundation or association representing the interested persons. 
The Court confirmed in this ruling that it has jurisdiction in case (i) not all 
potentially liable parties were residing in the Netherlands and (ii) the vast 
majority of the potential claimants were not residing in the Netherlands. It is 
expected that in the near future the possibilities of the WCAM for application 
in international collective settlements will be further explored.”). 
 a case that had originally been filed 
in the Southern District of New York but was later dismissed 
 140. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 
723–24 (D.N.J. 2007). 
 141. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 23 juni 2010, JOR 2010, 225 (Ahold) (Neth.).  
 142. See Legal Alert, Recognition of a U.S. Class Action Settlement in the 
Netherlands (Royal Ahold N.V.), DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK (June 
28, 2010), http://www.debrauw.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legal%20Alerts/ 
Litigation%20Arbitration/LA%20Recognition%20of%20a%20US%20% 
20Class%20Action%20Settlement%20in%20the%20Netherlands.pdf. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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under the now obsolete effects test, suggests that Dutch courts 
may continue to expand their jurisdiction and influence.146 In 
Copeland v. Fortis, the purchases of American Depository Re-
ceipts (ADRs) (a dollar denominated version of a non-U.S. secu-
rity) via an over-the-counter transaction did not qualify for Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 protection.147 According to the court, 
trading “in ADRs is considered to be a predominantly foreign 
securities transaction.”148
Under Dutch law, foundations can bring collective actions 
on behalf of investors.
 
149 After the Fortis case was dismissed in 
the United States, a group of international investors who were 
affected by the case, the Stichting Investor Claims Against For-
tis150
 
 146. See Fortis Writ, supra note 
 (the “Foundation”), in January 2011, filed a Writ in 
29. Under the now obsolete effects test, 
U.S. courts granted subject matter jurisdiction in cases where fraudulent acts 
committed abroad resulted “in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securi-
ties in whom the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have an 
adverse affect [sic] on the American economy or American investors general-
ly.” Parks v. Fairfax Fin. Holding Ltd., No. 06-CV-2820 (GBD), 2010 WL 
1372537, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 
Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 147. Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506. Much of the Court’s analysis in this 
case is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s June 2010 holding in Morrison. 
Compare id., with Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 148. Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506. 
 149. See VAN LITH, supra note 112, at 16; Hermans & de Bie Leuveling 
Tjeenk, supra note 112, ¶ 6; Karen Jelsma & Manon Cordewener, The Settle-
ment of Mass Claims: A Hot Topic in The Netherlands, INT’L L. Q., Summer 
2011, at 13, available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/035a19d4-
5aa9-4e43-b651-363f3031a0b9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/28345212-16e0 
-43be-9bcd-4199cce6ca23/The_Settlement_of_Mass_Claims_A_Hot_Topic_in_The_ 
Netherlands.pdf; Polak & Hermans, supra note 114, at 8; Dutch Response to the 
Public Consultation on a Coherent European Framework for Collective Re-
dress, EUR. COMM’N (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/ 
2011_collective_redress/nl_gov_en.pdf; Scott Hirst, Dutch Court Decision Im-
pacts Global Securities Class Actions, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Feb. 18, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/ 
2012/02/18/dutch-court-decision-impacts-global-securities-class-actions/ (“The 
Dutch Act [WCAM] permits an alleged wrongdoer, irrespective of whether any 
litigation is pending, to enter into a contract with a foundation that represents 
the interests of a purportedly injured group or class. Pursuant to that con-
tract, the wrongdoer agrees to compensate the foundation for the injuries suf-
fered by the group. The foundation and the alleged wrongdoer then submit the 
executed contract (or settlement agreement) to the Amsterdam Court of Ap-
peal and request that the Court order the contract binding on all members of 
the class. The class members are given an opportunity to object to the agree-
ment. If the Court declares the contract binding, class members are bound by 
the settlement unless they opt out and initiate individual proceedings.”). 
 150. The Foundation was established as an “open foundation” under article 
3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code and is seeking to represent investors who in-
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Utrecht District Court.151 They sued Fortis, now known as 
Ageas NV (“Fortis”),152 and Merrill Lynch alleging that they 
materially misled investors between May 2007 and September 
2008.153 The writ alleges that Fortis, its officers and directors, 
and its underwriter, Merrill Lynch International P.U.C.,154
 
vested in Fortis from May 29, 2007 through October 14, 2008. Home, 
STICHTING INVESTOR CLAIMS AGAINST FORTIS, http://investorclaimsagainst 
fortis.com/index.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
 
 151. The Court’s jurisdiction is based on Fortis N.V.’s registered seat and 
the fact that Fortis S.A./N.V.’s actions are inextricably linked with the actions 
of Fortis N.V. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 4 ¶¶ 16–17; see Rv art. 6–7 (Neth.), 
translated in Code of Civil Procedure, BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw 
.com/civilprocedureleg.htm (pertaining to regulation on the jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters). 
 152. Fortis was comprised of two companies. Fortis N.V. was a Dutch hold-
ing company of the former Dutch-Belgian Fortis banking and insurance con-
glomerate (now known as Ageas N.V.). Fortis S.A./N.V. was a Belgian holding 
company of the former Dutch-Belgian Fortis banking and insurance conglom-
erate (now known as Ageas S.A./N.V.). Together, Fortis N.V. and Fortis 
S.A./N.V. formed the conglomerate, Fortis Group (“dual set-up” whereby two 
companies headed the group). See Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 2.2 ¶ 5, § 5.1 
¶¶ 25–27. 
 153. See id. § 1 ¶¶ 1–2, § 2.1 ¶ 4. The Foundation relies heavily upon the 
Report on the Investigation into Fortis N.V. dated June 15, 2010, see F.J.G.M. 
Cremers et al., Verslag van het Onderzoek naar Fortis N.V. (2010) (Neth.), 
available at http://www.ageas.com/Documents/NL_final_report_dutch_ 
investigation_20100616.pdf, the Fortis Governance Statements dated January 
25, 2008, see Fortis Governance Statement, FORTIS (2008), http://www.csr-news 
.net/directory/ebook/4199/files/4199.pdf, the AFM penalty rulings dated Feb-
ruary 5, 2010, see AFM legt boetes op aan Fortis voor marktmanipulatie en niet 
tijdig publiceren koersgevoelige informatie, AFM (Neth.), http://www.afm 
.nl/nl/professionals/afm-actueel/nieuws/2010/mrt/boete-fortis.aspx, and dated 
August 19, 2010, see AFM legt boete op aan Ageas, voorheen Fortis, voor niet 
tijdig publiceren koersgevoelige informatie, AFM (Neth.), http://www.afm.nl/nl/ 
professionals/afm-actueel/nieuws/2010/aug/boete-ageas.aspx, and other public 
information in its allegations against Fortis and Merrill Lynch. The Founda-
tion also alleges that Fortis acted unlawfully by failing to invoke the MAC 
clause. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 6.3 ¶¶ 330–47. The MAC Clause in the 
ABN AMRO offer proposal defines a material adverse change as “any event, 
event or circumstance that results or could reasonably be expected to result in 
a material adverse effect on the business, cash flow, financial or trading posi-
tion, assets, profits, operational performance, capitalization, prospects or ac-
tivities of any . . . [h]oldings, . . . taken as a whole.” Id. § 5.2 ¶ 92. Prior to be-
ing bound by the offer, Fortis had the option of invoking the MAC Clause 
based on the deteriorating conditions in the financial market. Fortis did not 
invoke the Clause because of possible legal ramifications (litigation and repu-
tation risk). Id. § 5.2 ¶¶ 100–03. 
 154. The Foundation alleges that Merrill Lynch breached its duty of due 
care based on article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, 
§ 6.4 ¶ 358; see also BW art. 6:162 (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code, 
BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/dcctitle6633.htm. Specifical-
ly, Merrill Lynch, while officiating as coordinator in two of Fortis’ share issues, 
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made material misrepresentations concerning Fortis’s financial 
condition in the fall of 2007155 until the Dutch, Belgian, and 
Luxembourg governments orchestrated a bailout to save For-
tis.156 The Fortis bailout was valued at over €11 billion.157 Ac-
cording to the complaint, after raising €13 billion in a 2007 
rights offering, Fortis hid its significant exposure to U.S. sub-
prime loans and overrepresented its financial health,158 which 
resulted in a depreciation of shareholder equity by €26.2 bil-
lion.159 The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants160 misrepre-
sented the extent of assets held as subprime-related mortgage 
backed securities,161 the value of its collateralized debt obliga-
tions,162 and the impact of Fortis’s ABN AMRO acquisition on 
its solvency.163
 
failed to stop Fortis from making inaccurate statements and did not rectify the 
misleading statements. See Fortis Writ, supra note 
 Because of these fraudulent misrepresentations, 
29, § 1 ¶ 2. Regarding the 
share issue dated September 20, 2007, Merrill Lynch knew about the actual 
sub-prime situation at Fortis and that it departed from the description made 
in the Prospectus and the communications vis-à-vis the market, yet failed to 
prevent or rectify the inaccurate information. Id. § 6.4 ¶¶ 352–58. Regarding 
the share issue dated June 26, 2008, Merrill Lynch knew or should have 
known that comments made by Fortis in newspapers were inaccurate and in-
consistent with the actual situation, yet failed to stop these statements or rec-
tify them. Id. § 6.4 ¶¶ 359–68. 
 155. See id. § 8 ¶ 375; see also Press Release, Reuters, International Inves-
tors Join Forces in Support of Lawsuit Against Fortis over Massive Misrepre-
sentation Ahead of Bank's Collapse in 2008 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.investorclaimsagainstfortis.com/Attachment/193_Reuters%20 
-%20International%20Investors%20Join%20Forces%20in%20Support%20of% 
20Lawsuit%20Against%20Fortis%20-%2020110110%20(00027443).PDF [here-
inafter Reuters Press Release].  
 156. See Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 5.5 ¶ 182, § 6 ¶ 194. 
 157. Reuters Press Release, supra note 155.  
 158. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 5.2 ¶ 42, § 6.1 ¶ 216. 
 159. STICHTING INVESTOR CLAIMS AGAINST FORTIS, supra note 150. 
 160. See Fortis Writ, supra note 29, § 2.3 ¶¶ 7–11 (identifying key ex-board 
members at Fortis as responsible for making material misrepresentations to 
potential investors). 
 161. From May to October 2007, Fortis made inaccurate and incomplete 
disclosures regarding its sub-prime exposure and its liquidity and solvency in 
(1) the press release dated August 9, 2007, (2) the Trading Update, and (3) the 
Prospectus. Id. § 5.2 ¶¶ 36–109, § 6.1 ¶¶ 215–47.2 (relating to the 2007 Fortis 
offer to take over ABN AMRO in a consortium with Royal Bank of Scotland 
Plc. and Spain’s Banco Santander S.A.). 
 162. From early 2008 to June 26, 2008, Fortis engaged in misrepresenta-
tions regarding its solvency, the implementation of its solvency plan, and the 
dividend policy. Id. § 5.3 ¶¶ 110–51, § 6.1 ¶¶ 248–87. 
 163. From June 26, 2008 to September 26, 2008, Fortis engaged in misrep-
resentations regarding its solvency status, the negative impact in terms of sol-
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investors claim to have lost up to ninety percent of their in-
vestment.164
The Foundation bases its claims on Sections 6:193a–j (un-
fair trade practices)
  
165 and 6:194 (misrepresentation)166 of the 
Dutch Civil Code. Under Sections 6:193a–j, an unfair or mis-
leading trade practice occurs if the information furnished to in-
vestors is factually inaccurate or is misleading to the average 
consumer,167 and results in the consumer making a decision he 
or she would not otherwise have made.168 A misleading trade 
practice also occurs where essential information is omitted or is 
formulated in an unclear, incomprehensible, or ambiguous 
manner.169 Section 6:194 applies to information contained in the 
prospectus as well as written or oral communications made in 
connection with the offer of securities (emphasis added).170 In 
determining whether a prospectus is misleading, courts use the 
“presumed expectation of an averagely informed, cautious and 
observant investor.”171
it does not matter whether the ‘reference investor’ has effectively tak-
en cognizance of or has been influenced by the communication; all 
that matters is that the inaccuracy or incompleteness of the commu-
nication should be sufficiently significant materially to have been 
misleading to the ‘reference investor.’ What matters therefore is 
whether the inaccurate/incomplete communication per se is mislead-
ing.
 Under Dutch law,  
172
 
vency of the failure of the Ping An transaction, and its evaporated liquidity. 
Id. § 5.4 ¶¶ 152–79, § 6.1 ¶¶ 288–310.  
  
 164. STICHTING INVESTOR CLAIMS AGAINST FORTIS, supra note 150. 
 165. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 199. Sections 193a–j apply to actions per-
formed vis-à-vis natural persons, i.e., private investors. Id. 
 166. Id. ¶ 205. Section 194 applies to non-consumers, i.e., institutional in-
vestors. Id.  
 167. Id. ¶ 204. “It is not the characteristics and properties of the individual 
consumer . . . that are decisive . . . but rather, those of the fictitious consumer 
who is representative of the specific group . . . .” Id. Case law from the Euro-
pean Court of Justice describes the average consumer as the “reasonably in-
formed, cautious and observant consumer.” Id.  
 168. Id. ¶ 201. This is considered proactive dissemination of information. 
Id. 
 169. Id. ¶ 202. Non-disclosure of information required by Sections 13 and 
20 of Part 5 of the Financial Supervision Act gives rise to unfair trade practic-
es as defined in Sections 6:193a–j of the Dutch Civil Code. Id. ¶ 203.  
 170. Id. ¶ 209. See also HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. 
Frielink (VEB e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken 
.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162.  
 171. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 210 (quoting HR 30 mei 2008, JOR 2008, 
209 m.nt. BJJ (Claimants/TMF Financial Services BV) (Neth.)). 
 172. Id. ¶¶ 211–12 (“Once the communication has been established as be-
ing misleading, and as such unlawful, the misrepresentation has also been es-
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The Foundation also alleges that Fortis violated Sections 
5:13, 20, 25i, and 58(1) of the Dutch Financial Supervision 
Act.173 Section 5:13 stipulates that the prospectus should “con-
tain all data which is necessary . . . to enable investors to make 
an informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial 
position, profits and losses and prospects of the issuer and of 
any guarantor, and of the rights and obligations attached to 
such securities.”174 Section 20 prohibits statements that are not 
in line with the prospectus.175 Section 25i requires organiza-
tions to disclose price-sensitive information related to the or-
ganization.176
 
tablished as having contributed to the investment decision. In other words, the 
(professional or private) investor would not have bought shares, or would not 
have bought shares on the same terms, had the ill-fated communication not 
been made.”). 
 Section 58(1) bans market manipulation through 
the dissemination of information (potentially) giving out inac-
 173. Id. ¶ 195; see Wet op het Financieel Toezicht [Wft] [Financial Supervi-
sion Act] § 5:13 (Neth.), translated in Engelse vertaling van de Wft, 
RIJKSOVERHEID (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en 
-publicaties/brieven/2009/11/16/engelse-vertaling-van-de-wft.html.  
 174. Wft § 5:13. In World Online, the Supreme Court explained the purpose 
of the Act. The Act seeks to protect private and institutional investors alike so 
that they have “greater confidence in the securities market” and to ensure “the 
market’s proper performance.” Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 316 (quoting HR 
27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. Frielink (VEB e.a./World Online 
e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn= 
BH2162). 
 175. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 318. 
 176. Id. ¶ 321 (noting that price-sensitive information is “any information 
which a reasonably acting investor would probably” use to base his investment 
decision on (quoting Directive 2003/124/EC, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 22 December 2003 Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as Regards the Definition and Public 
Disclosure of Inside Information and the Definition of Market Manipulation, 
2003 O.J. (L339) 1(2)). The purpose of Section 25i is to prevent insider trading. 
Id. ¶ 321. The AFM imposed penalties on Fortis for non-timely disclosure of 
price-sensitive information regarding the transaction involving Deutsche Bank 
and communications related to Fortis’s sub-prime related exposure in 2007. 
Id. ¶ 323; see also Evan Weinberger, Fortis Dutch Fraud Suit Could Enable 
Non-US Claims, LAW 360 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http:// 
investorclaimsagainstfortis.com/Attachment/192_Law360%20-%20Fortis% 
20Dutch%20Fraud%20Suit%20Could%20Enable%20Non-US%20Claims%20 
-%2020110111%20(00027266).PDF. The subprime exposure “caused share-
holder equity in Fortis to fall from €33 billion . . . to . . . €6.8 billion . . . over 12 
months following the rights offering. According to the [F]oundation, investors 
lost up to 90 percent of their investment in Fortis due to the fraud . . . . A joint 
investigation by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets and the Bel-
gian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission found in February that 
Fortis engaged in market manipulation by issuing false and misleading 
statements prior to the ABN Amro rights offering.” Id. 
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curate or misleading signals regarding the availability of, de-
mand for or share price of financial instruments.177
The sections of Dutch law cited in the previous two para-
graphs give a flavor of the substantive legal rules available to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys who choose to file lawsuits in the Nether-
lands. Combined, these sections approximate legal protections 
available in the United States under Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5. Given the comparability, the Dutch legal system could 
present a possible avenue for circumventing the restrictions 
imposed by the Morrison decision. Investors who lost money in 
transactions on foreign exchanges and are prohibited from 
claiming damages in U.S. court under Morrison may find that 
the Netherlands constitutes an attractive venue.
  
178 Investors 
could make use of the Dutch law that permits foundations un-
der Article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code to sue on behalf of 
investors.179 It also seems possible that other countries, such as 
Canada, will capitalize on plaintiffs’ willingness to pursue other 
venues.180
The Fortis case illustrates that lawsuits filed in Dutch 
courts based on legal claims under Dutch law can largely mir-
ror the claims and allegations in previously dismissed lawsuits 
  
 
 177. Fortis Writ, supra note 29, ¶ 326. The AFM imposed penalties on For-
tis based on its misrepresentations over the period from January 27, 2008 to 
June 26, 2008 regarding Fortis’s solvency, solvency plan implementation, and 
dividend policy. Id. ¶¶ 327–28. 
 178. David Bario, Dutch Treat? With Doors to U.S. Courts Closed by Morri-
son, Securities Class Action Lawyers Sue Fortis in Holland, AM. LAW. (Jan. 10, 
2011), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202477589137 
&Dutch_Treat_With_Doors_to_US_Courts_Closed_by_Morrison_Securities_ 
Class_Action_Lawyers_Sue_Fortis_in_Holland&slreturn=20120806213334 
(quoting Jay Eisenhofer, co-managing partner of Grant & Eisenhofer, as say-
ing: “[o]ur clients are increasingly looking for forums where they’re going to be 
able to receive compensation for their non-U.S. losses,” and adding that “we’re 
looking at other cases that are in various stages of analysis”).  
 179. Reuters Press Release, supra note 155 (quoting Jay Eisenhofer as say-
ing: “[t]he foundation's action in the Netherlands offers an innovative avenue 
to address securities fraud claims outside the U.S. following the restrictions 
imposed on international investors by the Supreme Court's decision in Morri-
son v. NAB. We believe this action could be a model for future investor claims 
outside the United States”).  
 180. Bradley A. Heys & Mark L. Berenblut, Trends in Canadian Securities 
Class Actions: 2011 Update, NERA (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www 
.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Recent_Trends_Canada_2011_0412.pdf; Filings of 
Securities Class Actions in Canada Reach New High, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 1, 
2012), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120201005968/en/Filings-
Securities-Class-Actions-Canada-ReachHigh; LaCroix, supra note 85.  
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under U.S. law. The decision in Fortis is still pending.181
b. Converium 
 The 
case may proceed to a claims phase if the foundation succeeds 
in establishing liability.  
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal in its Converium decision 
declared an international collective settlement binding on the 
parties to a settlement where the class members had rather 
tenuous connections to the Netherlands (none of the defendants 
and only a few plaintiffs were domiciled in the Netherlands), 
the alleged wrongdoing took place outside the Netherlands, and 
the claims were not brought under Dutch law.182 The court in 
Converium suggested that without a single interested person 
domiciled in the Netherlands, the court could have upheld ju-
risdiction in the Netherlands to declare the settlement bind-
ing.183 This case seems to indicate that the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal will broaden its jurisdictional reach to provide interna-
tional investors with an attractive option for redress in class 
action legal suits.184
Similar to the Fortis case, Converium originated in 2004 in 
the United States when Converium
 
185
 
 181. See Weinberger, supra note 
 shareholders filed a secu-
176.  
 182. See Hof ’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. J.S. 
Kortmann (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS), ¶¶ 2.1, 2.3, 2.12 (Neth.), 
translated in http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/ 
Judgmentof12Novermber2010CourtofAppeal.pdf; Converium COA Decision, 
supra note 32, ¶ 3. 
 183. Legal Alert Converium, supra note 34.  
 184. Press Release, Reuters, In Landmark Ruling, Dutch Court of Appeal 
Approves Settlements in the Converium/SCOR Securities Action (Jan. 18, 
2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/18/idUS223043+18 
-Jan-2012+BW20120118; Mark Cobley, Dutch Ruling Could Pave Way for 
Class Action Suits, FIN. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.efinancialnews 
.com/story/2012-01-25/dutch-class-action-ruling-converium?mod= 
sectionheadlines-PE-AM; Cohen Milstein Secures Landmark Ruling as Dutch 
Court of Appeal Approves Settlements in the Converium/SCOR Securities Ac-
tion, COHEN MILSTEIN (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.cohenmilstein.com/ 
news.php?NewsID=487; LaCroix, supra note 22; Legal Alert, Converium: 
Dutch Court Declares an International Collective Settlement Binding, DE 
BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.debrauw.com/ 
News/LegalAlerts/Pages/LitigationLegalAlert-18January2012-Converium 
.aspx. 
 185. Converium Holding AG (Converium) is a Swiss reinsurance company 
(currently known as SCOR Holding Company) that was a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Zürich Financial Services Ltd. (ZFS) until 2001, when ZFS sold its 
Converium shares through an IPO. Reuters, supra note 184. Converium 
shares were listed on the SWX Swiss Exchange and Converium American De-
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rities class action in the Southern District of New York.186 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the price of Converium’s stock was artifi-
cially inflated during the class period because Converium had 
misrepresented its financial condition and had concealed a 
massive deficiency in its loss reserves for its North American 
business.187 Converium disclosed the misrepresentation and the 
deficiency in loss reserves in September 2004.188 The disclosure 
resulted in adverse stock price reactions and losses to inves-
tors.189 The U.S. class action was settled and the settlements 
were approved by the U.S. Court on December 12, 2008.190
The U.S. Court had excluded the Non-U.S. Purchasers 
from participation in the U.S. class action, so that they had no 
effective course for validating their potential claims.
  
191 Non-
U.S. Converium investors represented by the Stichting 
Converium Securities Compensation Foundation (the Founda-
tion)192 and Vereniging VEB NCVB (VEB),193 petitioned the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal under the WCAM to approve sepa-
rate settlement agreements with Converium and ZFS.194
 
pository Shares (ADS) were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. 
 In an 
interim decision, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal on November 
12, 2010 recognized the Settlement Agreements between the 
 186. Plaintiffs’ attorneys had filed a worldwide putative class action 
against Converium and ZFS in the United States. In re SCOR Holding (Swit-
zerland) AG Litigation, 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), available at 
http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00019_data/2008.12.12 
-ConveriumOrderFinalJudgment.pdf. The U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (the U.S. Court) certified a class consisting of all U.S. cit-
izens who had purchased Converium securities on any exchange as well as 
persons, regardless of their residence, who had purchased Converium securi-
ties on a U.S. exchange (the U.S. Purchasers). Id. at 569–79, 583. The U.S. 
Court excluded from the class all non-U.S. persons who had purchased 
Converium securities on any non-U.S. exchange (the Non-U.S. Purchasers). Id. 
at 569. 
 187. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 5.2.1. 
 188. In re SCOR Holding, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 565, 583. 
 189. Id. at 585. 
 190. See id. at 559.  
 191. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶¶ 6.4.1–2. 
 192. The Foundation represents the interests of Non-U.S. exchange pur-
chasers. Id. ¶ 5.1.3. Materials from the Foundation available at http://www 
.converiumsettlement.com/.  
 193. VEB represents the interests of Dutch exchange purchasers. 
Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 5.1.3. 
 194. Hof ’s-Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 m.nt. J.S. 
Kortmann (Converium Foundation VEB/SCOR ZFS), ¶¶ 2.1–3, 2.10. (Neth.), 
translated in http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/ 
Judgmentof12November2010CourtofAppeal.pdf. 
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Foundation and VEB with SCOR Holding/Converium (First 
Agreement) and ZFS (Second Agreement, together the Agree-
ments) pursuant to the WCAM.195
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal declared the Settlement 
Agreements binding on January 17, 2012.
  
196 The court found 
that in view of the extent of the loss, the ease and speed with 
which the compensation could be obtained, and the possible 
causes of the loss, the compensation awarded was reasonable.197
 
 195. The Settlement Agreements provide for compensation to eligible Non-
U.S. Purchasers of Converium stock. Converium COA Decision, supra note 
 
The court argued that the sum awarded to the Non-U.S. Pur-
chasers was proportionally lower than the settlement payment 
($84,600,000) for the smaller group of U.S. Purchasers because 
32, 
¶¶ 5.1.1–3. Specifically, the Agreements aim to compensate Non-U.S. Pur-
chasers who purchased Converium shares from January 7, 2002 to September 
2, 2004 on a non-U.S. stock exchange, and who incurred a loss as a result of 
the company’s (non)disclosures regarding its North American loss reserves. Id. 
The total settlement payment (before deduction of costs and fees) is USD 
40,000,000 under the First Agreement and USD 18,400,000 under the Second 
Agreement. Id. ¶ 5.2.3. Both agreements contain elaborated settlement distri-
bution plans for the distribution of the awards. See id. The settlement pay-
ment is in one or more segregated bank accounts administered by a civil law 
notary. Id. ¶ 7. The distribution plan is set forth in Exhibit C to the Settle-
ment Agreements. See Settlement Agreement Between the Foundation and 
VEB and SCOR, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP (July 2, 
2010), http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/SettlementAgreementwithSCOR 
.pdf; Settlement Agreement Between the Foundation and VEB and ZFS, 
BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP (July 2, 2010), http://www 
.blbglaw.com/cases/00172_data/SettlementAgreementwithZFS.pdf. 
 196. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 4.1. The Court stated that 
the Agreements satisfy the requirements of article 1013(1) and (2) of the 
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure regarding the announcement of the hearing and 
notification of interested parties. Id. ¶ 4.1; see Rv art. 1013(1), (2) (Neth.), 
translated in Code of Civil Procedure, BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw 
.com/legislation/civilprocedure033.htm#1013. Interested parties were notified 
by writ, registered letter, or ordinary letter. Converium COA Decision, supra 
note 32, ¶ 4.2.2. In addition, the hearing was announced in newspapers in 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and Switzerland in the Wall Street Journal Europe and the Economist, and on 
the websites www.converiumsettlement.com, www.blbglaw.com, www.srkw 
-law.com, www.cohenmilstein.com, and www.VEB.net. Converium COA Deci-
sion, supra note 32, ¶¶ 4.2.3–4. They also satisfy the requirements of articles 
7:907(3) and 7:908(2). Id. ¶ 5.1.4; see BW art. 7:907(3), 908(2) (Neth.), translat-
ed in Code of Civil Procedure, BRECHT, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/ 
legislation/dcctitle771515.htm (regarding reasonableness of the compensation 
awarded, representativeness of the foundation, and the availability of opt-out 
statements). The decision was rendered by Justices W.J.J. Los, A.H.A. 
Scholten, and J.W. Rutgers. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32.  
 197. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6. 
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the legal position of the Non-U.S. Purchasers differed substan-
tially from the legal position of the U.S. Purchasers.198
Importantly, the court held that the amount of fees and 
expenses awarded to Principal Counsel
  
199 (twenty percent of the 
settlement payment)200 was not excessive and was compatible 
with Dutch standards. Principal Counsel’s work was performed 
to a large extent within the American system and by U.S. law 
firms. The U.S. court awarded a similar fee in its 2008 decision, 
suggesting that the fee was customary and reasonable.201 Em-
pirical studies on the level of fees in comparable situations in-
dicate that a twenty percent fee is customary.202 Finally, com-
paring the contingent fee with an hourly fee (lodestar 
calculation) indicates that the two fees do not differ significant-
ly.203
The court found that it was sufficient for petitioners to be 
jointly represented, thus, affirming the standing of foundations 
under Dutch law.
  
204 The court also found that Non-U.S. Pur-
chasers who wanted to bring an individual claim to court had 
the option of opting out of the binding nature of the agreements 
by issuing an opt-out statement.205
 
 198. Id. ¶ 6.4.1. 
  
 199. Principal Counsel is a collaboration of three U.S. law firms (Bernstein 
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld & Toll, PLLC 
and Spector Roseman & Kodroff, PC). Id. ¶ 6.5.3. 
 200. Id. ¶ 6.5.1.  
 201. Id. ¶¶ 6.5.2–6.5.4; DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK, supra note 
184.  
 202. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.5.5. 
 203. Id. ¶ 6.5.6.  
 204. Id. ¶¶ 10.1–.2. The court held that VEB was sufficiently representa-
tive with respect to the interests of the Dutch exchange purchasers. Id. ¶ 10.3. 
The Foundation was incorporated to represent the interests of non-U.S. Pur-
chasers and has the support of twenty-nine foreign organizations, including 
European representative organizations and various representative organiza-
tions and institutional investors from Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
(the countries where most of the known Non-U.S. Purchasers are domiciled). 
Id. ¶ 10.4. 
 205. Id. ¶ 6.4.3. The Court believes that in view of the time, costs, and risks 
associated with conducting individual litigation, most Non-U.S. Purchasers 
are unlikely to bring their own litigation and therefore would not receive any 
compensation at all if the Agreements were not declared binding. The court 
stated that a person entitled to compensation could, within a period of three 
months following the announcement of the court decision, inform the appro-
priate authority in writing or by e-mail of his or her wish not to be bound. Id. 
¶¶ 14.1–.2, .4. For the person entitled to compensation who could not be cogni-
zant of his loss at the time of the announcement of the court decision, the time 
period for submitting an opt-out statement is six months after the entitled 
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The Converium decision adds several features to those es-
tablished by the Fortis decision. Jointly, these decisions could 
make the Dutch system even more attractive to investors who, 
before Morrison, would have considered bringing a claim in the 
United States. The application of Dutch civil law in the Fortis 
case suggests that the Dutch legal system can match legal pro-
tections available in the United States under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5. 
By allowing U.S.-style fee arrangements, the Converium 
decision adds an important incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
bring claims in the Netherlands. While awarding twenty per-
cent of the settlement to lead counsel206 is not quite at the level 
of some fee arrangements in the United States,207 twenty per-
cent should suffice to attract plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interest, es-
pecially in light of the cases that will no longer be brought in 
the United States because of the restrictions imposed by Morri-
son. While the court’s decision that a twenty percent fee is 
compatible with Dutch standards208
Another attractive feature of the Dutch legal system that 
could make it a favorite choice for plaintiffs’ attorneys is that 
decisions by Dutch courts under WCAM have to be recognized, 
at least in principle, in all European Member States, Switzer-
land, Iceland, and Norway under the Brussels I Regulation and 
the Lugano Convention.
 could make the Dutch legal 
system more attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys, the lead coun-
sel’s work in the Converium case was performed to a large ex-
tent within the American legal system and by U.S. law firms. It 
remains to be seen whether a case that is litigated in Dutch 
courts without exposure to the U.S. legal system will yield a 
comparable fee structure.  
209 The likely recognition of Shell, 
Ahold, Fortis, and Converium by other European Courts210
 
person has been informed in writing that he is eligible for compensation and 
may opt out of the binding declaration. Id. ¶ 14.3. 
 
could make the Dutch WCAM a valuable alternative for U.S. 
 206. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.5.1.  
 207. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees and Ex-
penses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 11–12 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, 
Econ., and Org., Working Paper No. 09-50, 2009), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1497224. 
 208. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.5.1.  
 209. Legal Alert Converium, supra note 34. 
 210. Under the Brussels I Regulation, a Dutch collective settlement de-
clared binding under the WCAM is binding for all other EU Member States. 
The same applies to Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway under the Lugano Con-
vention. See id. 
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class action settlements, which are less likely to be recognized 
by courts in European countries.  
The Netherlands is already Europe’s most attractive venue 
to facilitate such settlements because it is the only European 
country that allows a collective settlement in a mass litigation 
to be binding on all class members who do not opt-out of the 
class.211 Given the developments in the Fortis and Converium 
decisions, it is conceivable that Dutch courts could expand their 
exterritorial reach beyond settlements. The literature con-
trasting Shell and its progeny with Morrison suggests the in-
creasing prominence of Dutch courts after Morrison.212 There is 
even some evidence that the Converium court knew the impli-
cations of its judgment and was purposefully creating an alter-
native European venue for international collective settlements 
in mass claims.213 The court’s decision has some references to 
the limitations of U.S. courts in securities and anti-trust cases 
as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison.214
3. Fraud-on-the-Market  
  
In the United States, plaintiffs in securities class actions 
are not required to prove reliance on defendants’ alleged mis-
statements or omissions. Under the fraud-on-the-market theo-
ry, plaintiffs in U.S. courts merely have to show that they re-
lied on the integrity of the stock price when they purchased 
their stock.215 By contrast, private plaintiffs suing in European 
courts to recover damages for securities law violations are re-
quired in most European countries to establish individualized 
reliance.216
 
 211. See sources cited supra note 
 
149. 
 212. Polak & Hermans, supra note 114, at 6 (“[N]ow that ‘foreign cubed 
class actions’ have been made impossible in the United States . . . the Nether-
lands may be the place to certify a class action settlement involving non-US 
investors in non-US securities listed on a non-US stock exchange.”).  
 213. Legal Alert Converium, supra note 34 (“It should be noted that the 
Court is fully aware of the significance of its judgment in creating an alterna-
tive venue to declare international collective settlements in mass claims bind-
ing on all class members. The Court explicitly referred to the limitations for 
the U.S. courts to do so in securities and anti-trust cases as a result of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Hoff-
man-La Roche v. Empagran.”).  
 214. Id.  
 215. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).  
 216. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
com., Nov. 22, 2005, Bull. civ. IV, No. 03-20600 (Fr.) (holding that under 
French law individual plaintiffs are required to prove actual reliance); 
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Unlike other European countries, the Dutch Supreme 
Court in its World Online decision established a presumption of 
reliance/causation for cases involving prospectus liability.217 
The court recognized that investors are guided by a multitude 
of considerations in making an investment decision. Proving re-
liance and causation leading to an investment decision because 
of a misleading statement in a prospectus could be near impos-
sible.218 Given the problems with causality and reliance, and 
recognizing that the Prospectus Directive219 envisions investor 
protection as one of its core objectives,220 the court established a 
presumption of a causal connection between the misleading 
statement in the prospectus and the investment decision.221
 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 28, 2005, II ZR 80/04 
(Ger.) (rejecting Basic Inc. v. Levinson’s fraud-on-the-market theory); Theodor 
Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corpo-
rate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 71 
(2005) (contrasting the U.S. fraud-on-the-market theory with the German re-
quirement of actual reliance); Hubert de Vauplane & Odile Simart, The Con-
cept of Securities Manipulation and Its Foundations in France and the USA, 
23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 203, 205 (1997) (noting that France has not adopted the 
fraud-on-the-market theory); Eilís Ferran, Are US-Style Investor Suits Coming 
to the UK?, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 315, 327, 336 (2009) (noting that the fraud-on-
the-market theory has not yet been adopted in the United Kingdom or Aus-
tralia). 
 Ac-
cordingly, under the holding in World Online, plaintiffs do not 
 217. HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. Frielink (VEB 
e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ 
detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162; see also de Jong, supra note 25, at 364–65 (dis-
cussing the World Online decision and its implications); Thompson, supra note 
25, at 1138–40 (explaining the differences of the Dutch and U.S. systems of 
securities litigation and underscoring the attractiveness of the Dutch rules). 
Similarly, after a class action regime was introduced in Italy, the Italian Su-
preme Court adopted something comparable to the U.S. fraud-on-the-market 
theory, introducing a presumption of reliance and, thus, allowing investors to 
bring a claim based on a misleading statement in a prospectus or official com-
pany announcement without having read the respective document. See ALLEN 
& OVERY, supra note 22.  
 218. See de Jong, supra note 25, at 356. 
 219. Directive 2010/73, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 Amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the Prospectus to Be 
Published When Securities Are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading 
and 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Re-
lation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading 
on a Regulated Market, 2010 O.J. (L 327) 1, available at http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:327:0001:0012:EN:PDF.  
 220. See id. at Preamble ¶ 3.  
 221. de Jong, supra note 25, at 364. 
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have to show actual reliance on a fraudulent statement in pro-
spectus liability cases.222
Dutch courts could extend the theory of the Dutch Su-
preme Court, establishing a presumption of reliance in prospec-
tus liability cases, to other areas of the law. The “line of reason-
ing of the court extends quite naturally to claims dealing with 
the violation of ad hoc disclosure obligations and misleading 
periodic reports.”
  
223
4. Countervailing Factors  
 These developments suggest that the Dutch 
legal system could effectively compete with the United States, 
at least as it pertains to lowering the crucial threshold re-
quirement of reliance in securities actions. Lower substantive 
and procedural requirements for securities actions in the Neth-
erlands could attract plaintiffs that would have brought a for-
eign-cubed securities action in the United States before Morri-
son and perhaps even some plaintiffs who still can sue in the 
United States. 
The Dutch WCAM includes an opt-out procedure similar to 
the securities class action rules in the United States.224 As ex-
plained above, the Netherlands may also relax the reliance re-
quirement in some cases. Other factors, however, could weigh 
against the Dutch legal system in attracting international 
plaintiffs, particularly those from the United States. The Dutch 
legal system also has not played a significant role in attracting 
lawsuits in the past.225
English being the official language of a court system plays 
an important role in litigants’ selection criteria.
 
226
 
 222. Id.  
 Dutch courts 
hear cases in Dutch, although this could change in the future if 
 223. Id. at 375.  
 224. DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK, supra note 142. The Nether-
lands is one of only four countries that allow the opt-out procedure to be used. 
Other countries are the United States, Canada, and South Korea. See Hannah 
L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: 
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 61 (2007) 
(“[T]he United States is unusual in recognizing presumed reliance based on 
the fraud on the market theory, rather than requiring investors to prove actu-
al reliance on misleading information.”); Luke Green, Multi-National Securi-
ties Class Actions Go Global, INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., INC. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2011, 
6:26 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2011/01/multi-national-securities 
-class-action-go-international.html. 
 225. See Thompson, supra note 25, at 1141.  
 226. See Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 176–77 (explaining 
the importance of the English language in the competition of legal systems).  
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lawyers are given an option to plead and argue in English.227 
The attorney compensation framework in the Netherlands 
could also be detrimental to the development of a competitive 
regulatory framework. Although cases such as Converium with 
large exposure to the U.S. legal system have resulted in attor-
ney fees of up to twenty percent of the settlement payment,228 
the lack of contingent-fee arrangements generally and the los-
er-pays rule in the Netherlands may not provide sufficient in-
centives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue legal claims in the 
Netherlands.229 Other crucial differences between the class ac-
tion systems of the United States and the Netherlands include 
differences in plaintiff representation. The WCAM in the Neth-
erlands requires a court-approved foundation to pursue the se-
curities class action on behalf of investors.230
Under the WCAM, only court-authorized representatives, 
such as the aforementioned foundation, can pursue claims on 
behalf of investors.
 This WCAM re-
quirement makes the Dutch regime somewhat more 
burdensome than the United States’ system, which simply re-
quires a lead plaintiff and class approval.  
231
 
 227. In Germany, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hamburg introduced the 
English language in court proceedings. See Michael Karger, NRW und Ham-
burg: die Gerichtssprache ist: . . . auch Englisch, BECK-BLOG, 
 Because Dutch courts in WCAM proceed-
http://blog.beck 
.de/2010/01/15/nrw-und-hamburg-die-gerichtssprache-ist-auch-englisch. The 
reform of German procedural law to establish English in German courtrooms 
arguably would benefit German attorneys. See Im Namen der Globalisierung, 
ZEIT ONLINE (May 23, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://www.zeit.de/2010/21/Justiz 
-Prozesse-Englisch.  
 228. Converium COA Decision, supra note 32, ¶ 6.5.1 (holding that a twen-
ty percent attorney fee was compatible with Dutch legal standards).  
 229. On the other hand, legal practices focusing exclusively on class actions 
in Europe seem to indicate that the monetary incentives could be sufficient. 
See supra note 119 and accompanying text; John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Gov-
ernance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 292 (2010) 
(discussing the respective attorney compensation schemes in the United 
States and Europe); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate 
Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 180–81 (2009); see also 
Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland, 
27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 301, 303 (2007); Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Liti-
gation Trends, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 183 (2009); Richard Cappalli, The 
Style and Substance of Civil Procedure Reform: Comparison of the United 
States and Italy, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 861, 869 (1994); Harald 
Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law, 11 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 355, 365 (2001); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of 
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653–54 (dis-
cussing the loser pays practices in European legal systems).  
 230. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the features of the WCAM).  
 231. BW art. 3:305a (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil Code, BRECHT, 
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ings are limited to certifying the class and approving out-of-
court settlements,232 court-authorized representatives cannot 
seek damages.233 Instead, under the WCAM an agreement be-
tween the alleged wrongdoer and the foundation, representing 
the interests of the injured class, determines the compensation 
for the class.234 After class members have the opportunity to re-
ject the agreement, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has the 
discretion to declare the agreement binding.235 Although the 
judgment of the Dutch court is in principle enforceable in 
courts outside the Netherlands, it remains to be seen whether 
or not courts in other jurisdictions will, in fact, recognize the 
judgment. There are also different discovery practices in the 
United States than in the Netherlands236 and different settle-
ment mechanisms.237
Given these limitations, the WCAM system could limit the 
number of successful settlements. While the largest cases, such 
as Shell and Fortis, would probably still provide sufficient lev-
erage for the plaintiffs to result in large settlements with de-
fendants, smaller cases may not be successfully settled in 
Dutch courts. Lawyers who have the option to sue in the Unit-
ed States after Morrison may prefer to do so. 
 
 
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook033.htm; VAN LITH, supra note 
112, at 16; Hermans & de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, supra note 112, ¶ 6; Tzankova 
& Scheuerleer, supra note 127, at 152; van Boom, supra note 119, at 10; Brief-
ing Note, Overview of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in EU Member 
States, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEP’T A: ECON. & 
SCIENTIFIC POLICY, § 2.11, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-16 (July 2011), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/ 
20110715ATT24242/20110715ATT24242EN.pdf; EUR. COMM’N, supra note 
149, at 4. 
 232. van Boom, supra note 119, at 858 n.3; DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTER-
NAL POLICIES POLICY DEP’T A: ECON. AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY, supra note 231, 
§ 2.11; EUR. COMM’N, supra note 149, at 6. 
 233. van Boom, supra note 119, at 864; EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 
149, at 4. 
 234. See Hirst, supra note 149. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Plaintiffs can usually obtain broad discovery in the United States alt-
hough only after a motion to dismiss has been decided in their favor. Scott 
Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 67 (2010); see van 
Boom, supra note 119, at 10. 
 237. See van Boom, supra note 119, at 10. 
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C. CANADA AS A FORUM FOR MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTIONS  
Because there is already extensive English language com-
mentary on securities litigation in Canada, this Article will not 
explore securities litigation in Canada in as much detail as re-
cent developments in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, because 
most Canadian courts use the English language, and because of 
Canada’s geographic proximity to the United States, Canada is 
a natural venue for securities litigation that can no longer be 
conducted in the United States after Morrison. European juris-
dictions that provide a forum for global securities litigation will 
likely engage in Forum Competition with Canada. Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers will urge European jurisdictions to mimic pro-plaintiff 
developments in Canada and vice versa. Defendants, on the 
other hand, will look to both Europe and Canada for restraint, 
perhaps similar to that imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Morrison. 
U.S. courts applying Morrison have thus far refused to ap-
ply U.S. securities laws to transactions taking place in Canada, 
even if the same securities are also listed for trading in the 
United States.238
For plaintiffs and their lawyers, however, Canada is al-
ready an attractive alternative to the United States when it 
comes to filing securities class action lawsuits.
 Canada thus has an opportunity to engage in 
Forum Competition with the United States if its courts assume 
a different posture and allow suits under Canadian law with 
respect to all transactions in securities listed for trading in 
Canada, even if some of those transactions take place in the 
United States. A single class of Canadian and U.S. investors 
that cannot be assembled in the United States after Morrison 
could, in this scenario, be assembled in Canada. It remains to 
be seen, however, what Canada will do to accommodate extra-
territorial securities litigation of this or any other sort. 
239 Several fac-
tors, including recent Supreme Court decisions in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes240
 
 238. See In re Vivendi Universal Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
 239. Ashby Jones, Lawyers Looking to Canada for Shareholder Litigation, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2012, at B4.  
 240. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
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cion,241 suggest a judicial hostility to class action litigation in 
the United States that may not be present in Canada. Since the 
U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Morrison decision on 
June 24, 2010, securities class action suits appear to have 
gained traction in Canada.242 Although there is some evidence 
that class actions were already on the rise in Canada prior to 
the Morrison decision,243 in 2011 alone, fifteen new class actions 
were filed in Canada, increasing the number of active class ac-
tions from thirty to forty-five as of December 31, 2011.244 Nine 
of the fifteen cases filed in 2011 were filed under the continu-
ous disclosure provisions of Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securi-
ties Act (OSA), enacted in 2005.245
 
 241. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Coffee, supra note 
  
20, at 14 (discussing 
the impact of these and other Supreme Court decisions on class actions in the 
United States). 
 242. Jones, supra note 239, at B4; LaCroix, supra note 85. 
 243. Mark L. Berenblut et al., Trends in Canadian Securities Class Actions: 
1997–2008, NERA (Jan. 2009), https://www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/ 
PUBTrendsCanada.pdf. According to the NERA report, a spike in class actions 
took place in 2008. Id. at 2, 4. Claims focused mainly on improper accounting, 
misleading earnings guidance, insider trading, product/operational defects, 
and customer/vendor issues. Id. at 6. This upsurge was due in part to the ef-
fects of the credit crisis on Canadian financial markets. Id. at 6. 
 244. Heys & Berenblut, supra note 180, at 1. 
 245. Id. Bill 198 cases refer to cases brought under the continuous disclo-
sure provisions of Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act enacted in 2005 or 
analogous provisions of other provincial securities acts. See Ontario Securities 
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/ 
statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e.htm#BK247 (providing a statutory 
cause of action for secondary market misrepresentation); see also Keeping the 
Promise for a Strong Economy Act (Budget Measures) ONT. SEC. COMM’N 
(2002), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities/ar_20021112_bill 
-198.pdf. These new class actions are estimated to represent approximately 
CAD $24.5 billion in claims. Heys & Berenblut, supra note 180, at 1. Bill 198 
claims were filed against the following issuers in 2011: Alange Energy, Armtec 
Infrastructure Inc., BCE Inc., Canada Lithium Corporation, Cathay Forest 
Products, Eastern Platinum Limited, North American Palladium, Sino-Forest 
Corporation, Zungui Haixi Corporation. Id. at 4. The plaintiffs in two of the 
Bill 198 cases—IMAX and Arctic Glacier—were granted leave to proceed with 
their claims and the cases were certified as class actions. Id. at 12; see Kevin 
LaCroix, In Landmark Rulings, Ontario Court Allows IMAX Securities Suit to 
Proceed, Certifies Class, D & O DIARY (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.dandodiary 
.com/2009/12/articles/securities-litigation/in-landmark-rulings-ontario-court 
-allows-imax-securities-suit-to-proceed-certifies-class/; Kevin LaCroix, Leave to 
Proceed, Class Certification Given in Another Ontario Securities Suit, D & O 
DIARY (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/03/articles/ 
international-d-o/leave-to-proceed-class-certification-given-in-another-ontario 
-securities-suit/; see also Dobbie v. Arctic Glacier Income Fund 2011 ONSC 25 
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/ 
2011/2011onsc25/2011onsc25.html (certifying class action for secondary mar-
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There is some evidence that securities class action filings 
in Canada will continue to proliferate.246 Several factors may 
contribute to a continuing increase in Canadian class action fil-
ings in 2012 and beyond: (1) the impact of Morrison on claims 
in U.S. courts for non-U.S. investors in non-U.S. stocks (which 
makes Canada a more attractive venue for these cases), (2) the 
growth in the Canadian class action bar in terms of both firms 
and lawyers bringing and defending the cases, (3) Canadian 
rulings granting certification of global classes and giving plain-
tiffs leave to proceed, and (4) the success of class counsel in 
reaching multi-million dollar settlements in Canada (and class-
counsel fee awards).247
The growth in the Canadian class action bar suggests that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys view Canadian courts as an increasingly 
attractive venue for investors to pursue their claims.
  
248 Recent-
ly, plaintiffs in Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc.249 chose to file in 
Canada even though the shares were listed on the NASDAQ in 
the United States.250 On March 30, 2012, the Ontario Court of 
Appeals held that “[e]xtra-territorial application is specifically 
envisaged by . . . the definition of ‘responsible issuer,’ with its 
reference to issuers with a ‘real and substantial connection’ to 
Ontario.”251 As a result, Ontario class action filings against for-
eign issuers could increase dramatically.252
 
ket misrepresentations); Silver v. IMAX Corp. (2008), 167 A.C.W.S. (3d) 881 
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2008/ 
2008canlii21905/2008canlii21905.html (granting leave to proceed with first 
claim under OSA). The other cases include a shareholder class action involv-
ing prospectus claims, a claim related to a takeover bid, two actions related to 
the management of investment funds, and two allegations of a Ponzi scheme. 
Heys & Berenblut, supra note 
  
180, at 4. 
 246. Id. at 13. 
 247. Id. at 1.  
 248. LaCroix, supra note 85; see Rubin, supra note 85 (discussing U.S. class 
action attorney relocating to Canada).  
 249. 2011 ONSC 5105 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), available at http://www 
.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2011/2011onsc5105/2011onsc5105.html, aff’d, 2012 
ONCA 211 (Can. Ont. Ct. App.). 
 250. Heys & Berenblut, supra note 180, at 5; see also Brandon Kain, OCA 
to Address Secondary Market Claims Against Foreign-Listed Issuers, CAN. AP-
PEALS MONITOR (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.canadianappeals.com/2012/01/20/ 
oca-to-address-secondary-market-claims-against-foreign-listed-issuers/ (dis-
cussing the potential impact of the Court of Appeals’ ruling).  
 251. Canadian Solar, 2012 ONCA 211, at para. 88, available at http://www 
.ontariocourts.ca/decisions/2012/2012ONCA0211.htm. 
 252. Kain, supra note 250. 
  
2012] COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LAW 189 
 
The plaintiff in Canadian Solar, an Ontario investor,253 
commenced an action against the defendant issuer and two of 
its officers and directors, seeking damages for misrepresenta-
tion, leave to commence an action for secondary market mis-
representations under section 138.3 of the OSA,254 and an op-
pression remedy pursuant to the Canada Business 
Corporations Act.255 The court denied defendant’s motion to 
dismiss256 finding that Canadian Solar fell under the definition 
of “responsible issuer” in section 138.1 of the OSA257 and had a 
“real and substantial connection to Ontario”258
 
 253. The plaintiff resides in Markham, Ontario. 2011 ONSC 5015 at para. 
4. The plaintiff purchased a total of 2,000 shares of Canadian Solar between 
January 21 and May 4, 2010. Id. at para. 5. 
 because: (1) it 
was incorporated in Canada, (2) it had an executive office in 
Ontario, (3) it carried on business and held its annual meeting 
in Ontario, and (4) the alleged misrepresentations were con-
 254. Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), available at 
http://www.elaws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e 
.htm#BK262. 
 255. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, available at 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-44.pdf; Canadian Solar, 2011 ONSC 5105, 
at para. 1. 
 256. Canadian Solar, 2011 ONSC 5105, at para. 1. The defendants moved 
to dismiss the case arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because: (1) Ca-
nadian Solar’s shares traded exclusively on the NASDAQ, (2) Canadian Solar 
was governed by the federal CBCA rather than Ontario corporations law, (3) 
Canadian Solar’s principal place of business was in China, (4) the majority of 
Canadian Solar’s manufacturing operations occurred in China, (5) the majori-
ty of Canadian Solar’s senior executives resided in China, including the two 
director/officer defendants, (6) the press releases were filed with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, (7) the press releases were fol-
lowed by conference calls in which the director/officer defendants participated 
from China, (8) the annual report was filed with the SEC, and (9) the prospec-
tus supplement was filed with the SEC. See Kain, supra note 250. 
 257. Canadian Solar, 2011 ONSC 5105 at para. 46; see also Ontario Secu-
rities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/ 
html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e.htm#BK262 (“Where a respon-
sible issuer or a person or company with actual, implied or apparent authority 
to act on behalf of a responsible issuer releases a document that contains a 
misrepresentation, a person or company who acquires or disposes of the issu-
er’s security during the period between the time when the document was re-
leased and the time when the misrepresentation contained in the document 
was publicly corrected has, without regard to whether the person or company 
relied on the misrepresentation, a right of action for damages against, (a) the 
responsible issuer; (b) each director of the responsible issuer . . . ; (c) each of-
ficer of the responsible issuer who authorized, permitted, or acquiesced in the 
release of the document . . . .”).  
 258. Canadian Solar, 2011 ONCA 5105 at para. 46. 
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tained in press releases and other documents such as financial 
statements that were released or presented in Ontario.259
Some Canadian jurisdictions have recently eliminated the 
reliance requirement for securities-fraud actions,
 
260 another fac-
tor that could encourage plaintiffs to file securities class actions 
in Canadian courts rather than in courts in the United 
States.261 Class certification requirements and contingent-fee 
arrangements in the United States and Canada are relatively 
similar, which could also attract plaintiffs familiar with the 
U.S. system.262
Despite these similarities, the certification of global classes 
raises conflict-of-laws issues that could be an obstacle.
  
263 Courts 
may have to specify under what circumstances an Ontario 
court can assume jurisdiction over foreign class members. Sil-
ver v. IMAX Corp.264 raises many choice of law concerns. As 
Tanya Monestier notes: “What law governs the statutory claims 
of claimants who purchase and sell securities on a foreign ex-
change? Would a Canadian court apply foreign securities law in 
a domestic proceeding . . . ?”265
In IMAX, plaintiffs sought leave to commence a proceeding 
under section 138.3 of Part XXIII.1 of the OSA and certification 
as a class action.
 
266 IMAX was a Canadian company headquar-
tered in Ontario, plaintiffs were Ontario residents, and IMAX 
shares were traded on both the TSX and NASDAQ.267 Plaintiffs 
claimed that several of IMAX’s financial filings and press re-
leases contained misrepresentations that caused the value of 
their shares to decline.268
 
 259. Id. 
 Plaintiffs asserted common law mis-
representation and statutory misrepresentation under the 
 260. Knutsen, supra note 25, at 157; Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 25, at 
892.  
 261. Noam Noked, A New Playbook for Global Securities Litigation and 
Regulation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 2, 
2012, 9:53 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/02/a-new 
-playbook-for-global-securities-litigation-and-regulation/. 
 262. Id.  
 263. Monestier, supra note 85, at 16. 
 264. Silver v. IMAX Corp. (2009), 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. 
J.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2009/2009canlii72334/ 
2009canlii72334.html. 
 265. Monestier, supra note 85, at 53. 
 266. IMAX, 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273 at paras. 5–6.  
 267. Id. at paras. 1, 4.  
 268. Id. at paras. 1, 2.  
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OSA.269 The court certified both the statutory and common law 
causes of action “despite the fact that [the plaintiffs] had not 
pleaded individual reliance on the defendant’s misstate-
ments.”270 The court in IMAX thus seems to have lowered the 
threshold for class certification in Canadian common law mis-
representation cases in securities class actions.271
The still unresolved issue—and indeed the critical issue for 
Forum Competition—is the extent to which Canada will allow 
suits to be brought in its courts over transactions taking place 
outside Canada. Will Canada apply a transactional test similar 
to Morrison, or will Canada apply a more expansive test, per-
haps similar to the conduct and effects tests previously used in 
the United States, that would allow at least some U.S. securi-
ties transactions, and also, perhaps, transactions taking place 
in other countries, to be subject to litigation in Canada? If Can-
ada chooses to allow these suits, will its courts apply Canadian 
law or the law of the country where the transaction took place? 
Will Canada apply its own law to all transactions in securities 
listed for trading in Canada (even if they are also listed for 
trading in New York), regardless of where the plaintiffs’ trans-
actions took place? Canada has an opportunity to engage in 
vigorous Forum Competition with the United States and, per-
haps, with Europe and other jurisdictions, to the benefit of 
plaintiffs and their Canadian lawyers, but it remains to be seen 
whether Canada will choose to do so. 
  
Clearly some securities litigation will migrate from the 
United States to Canada after Morrison, such as litigation in-
volving securities transactions taking place in Canada. The un-
resolved question is whether Canada will also provide a forum 
for litigation over other securities transactions that took place 
in the United States, in Europe, or somewhere else outside of 
Canada.  
 
 269. Id. at paras. 4, 5.  
 270. Monestier, supra note 85, at 8; see also IMAX, 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273 at 
para. 190.  
 271. IMAX, 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273 at paras. 25, 56–75 (“For the purpose of cer-
tification, the question is whether the Claim discloses a cause of action in neg-
ligent misrepresentation. I have concluded that it does disclose such a cause of 
action, notwithstanding the absence of a pleading of direct individual reliance 
by each class member. In the event that the plaintiffs are unable to prove reli-
ance, it will remain open for them to argue at trial that reliance is not re-
quired.”); see also Monestier, supra note 85, at 8 (discussing the low parame-
ters set by IMAX). 
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III.  CHOICE OF LAW COMPETITION AFTER MORRISON   
The Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison is likely to have 
a profound impact on Choice of Law Competition, although in a 
very different way than its impact on Forum Competition. 
Whether or not the Court intended such a result, the Morrison 
holding will give at least some transacting parties considerable 
latitude to decide what law applies to their transactions. 
The transactional test in Morrison could be relatively short 
lived because it is rooted in geography and an increasing num-
ber of securities transactions defy geographical boundaries. 
While the transactional test provides more predictability than 
the conduct and effects tests that preceded it, there is ample 
room for ambiguity, particularly for transactions that do not 
take place on organized exchanges. Even transactions that do 
take place on organized exchanges may be difficult to define ge-
ographically if the exchanges themselves cross geographical 
boundaries.  
Redirecting the focal point of securities regulation from the 
geographic location of securities transactions toward the choice 
of law by buyers and sellers of securities—or the choice of law 
of the exchanges where securities are listed—could prove more 
effective than trying to impose a single body of law on securi-
ties transactions within a certain geographic area, at least in 
cases where the geographic location of a transaction and the 
applicable law are uncertain.  
A. CHALLENGES FOR A TRANSACTION TEST ROOTED IN 
GEOGRAPHY 
Erin O’Hara and Larry Ribstein devote much of their book 
on jurisdictional competition to Choice of Law Competition that 
is decoupled from the geographic location of parties or transac-
tions.272
In the post-Morrison regime, however, the geographic loca-
tion of the transaction determines whether U.S. law applies. 
The contract between the buyer and seller will determine 
choice of law only if the contract removes the securities trans-
action from the geographic boundaries of the United States. 
This transactional test severely limits Choice of Law Competi-
 Transacting parties, regardless of where they are locat-
ed, choose the law they want to apply, and jurisdictions com-
pete to induce transacting parties to choose their law. Nobody 
has to move anywhere to affect a choice of law. 
 
 272. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 15.  
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tion by tying parties to U.S. transactions to U.S. law; any 
transaction within the territorial boundaries of the United 
States is subject to U.S. law.  
The geographic location of a transaction, however, is in 
some instances difficult to identify. It is also in some instances 
relatively easy to manipulate. For organized exchanges, the lo-
cation is usually easy to determine if there is only one location 
for the exchange, but it may not be easy to determine if the ex-
change has branches in more than one country and trades are 
executed electronically rather than on an exchange floor. Ex-
changes will probably specify rules stating what transactions 
on an exchange take place in the United States and what 
transactions do not. The SEC must approve the rules of U.S. 
exchanges, but foreign exchanges are subject to supervision by 
foreign regulators. Exchanges that operate in both the United 
States and in other countries will need to implement rules 
identifying the transaction location that are acceptable to regu-
lators and courts in all relevant jurisdictions. 
There is some controversy over securities that are listed in 
the United States but also traded somewhere else. The Court in 
Morrison states in two places in its opinion that Section 10(b) 
applies if a security is “listed” in the United States.273 This dis-
tinction is relevant for “dual listed” securities, for example, 
those that are listed and traded in New York and Toronto. The 
Court probably did not mean that Section 10(b) applies to the 
trades in Toronto as well as the trades in New York, but, argu-
ably, this is literally what the Court said in these passages in 
Morrison. The better argument—so far endorsed by the district 
courts in the Southern District of New York—is that applying 
Section 10(b) to the Canadian transactions would be contrary to 
the transaction test that is emphasized throughout the Morri-
son opinion.274 Indeed, National Australia Bank itself had 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) listed for trading in New 
York, and yet the Court refused to allow a private right of ac-
tion for purchasers of its stock in Australia that was the func-
tional equivalent of these ADRs.275
 
 273. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010). 
 However, some commenta-
tors argue that this issue is not so clear cut, and there are 
 274. See Painter et al., supra note 59, at 8–9 (discussing In re Vivendi Uni-
versal Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).  
 275. See id. at 2. 
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policy arguments for applying Section 10(b) to Canadian trans-
actions if the securities are listed in the United States.276
Transactions off of organized exchanges are even more 
complicated. Private transactions in securities can be difficult 
to locate.
 
277 It is often unclear if the physical location of one or 
both parties or their agents is an important factor, or whether 
the place where the transaction clears—where title to securities 
is transferred or where the money or other consideration 
changes hands—matters more. Another test, embraced by the 
Second Circuit in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund v. 
Ficeto,278
B. FROM GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION TOWARD CHOICE OF LAW 
 is that the transaction takes place in the United 
States for purposes of Morrison if either the title to the securi-
ties is transferred in the United States or the parties incur ir-
revocable liability to purchase or deliver the securities in the 
United States. This test may provide a clear answer for some 
transactions, but for others it may not be clear where irrevoca-
ble liability was incurred. Furthermore, this test is easy to ma-
nipulate by agreeing that one or both parties will take steps to 
create irrevocable liability outside the United States, for exam-
ple, by making liability on the transaction contingent upon ap-
proval of the transaction by an agent located outside the United 
States.  
Jurisdictional competition in U.S. corporate law is based on 
contracts rather than geography. To some extent this is also 
true of European corporate law after the European Court of 
Justice’s Inspire Art decision rejected some aspects of “seat the-
ory.”279
Securities law traditionally has rejected this approach. 
Contractual opting-out is not permissible under the Securities 
 Incorporators—and persons who become shareholders, 
directors, and officers in their corporations—opt into a particu-
lar jurisdiction’s corporate law. If shareholders, directors, and 
officers perceive their initial choice as suboptimal later, they 
can opt out of the original jurisdiction and opt into another ju-
risdiction’s corporate law by reincorporating somewhere else. It 
does not matter where the corporation is located or where it 
does business. 
 
 276. See Fox, supra note 12, at 85–89.  
 277. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 82, at 88–91. 
 278. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 62 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
 279. See Kirchner, Painter & Kaal, supra note 15, at 89. 
  
2012] COMPETITION IN SECURITIES LAW 195 
 
Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.280 Morrison, 
however, may force a reconsideration of this position, at least 
for those transactions that are easy to structure to take place 
outside the United States so that U.S. securities laws will not 
apply. If the parties contractually agree to have the transaction 
take place somewhere else, such as in London, Morrison re-
quires that U.S. courts respect this choice. This is true even if 
most of the design and marketing of the transaction occurred 
inside the United States; Section 10(b) does not apply in private 
lawsuits if there is no actual U.S. transaction.281
One alternative is to abandon Morrison’s transactional 
test—as well as the hostility of U.S. securities laws to private 
ordering—and substitute a pure choice of law regime in which 
contracting parties specify the jurisdiction whose securities law 
applies. Congress is unlikely to enact such a regime, however, 
and the statutory restrictions on parties contractually opting 
out of U.S. securities law will prevent U.S. courts from impos-
ing a pure choice of law regime. On the other hand, courts will 
also have to deal with the wide range of transactions that can-
not definitively be identified as taking place inside or outside 
the United States. For these transactions in which the transac-
tional test cannot easily be applied anyway, the choice of law 
rule might be the best solution.  
 By choosing 
the location of the transaction, the parties have effectively cho-
sen to opt out of U.S. securities law. 
A rule that allows the parties’ choice of law to control for 
geographically ambiguous transactions could be harmonized 
with both Morrison and the existing statutory framework. The 
rule would stipulate that unless a transaction is unambiguous-
ly inside the United States, the transaction does not take place 
inside the United States if the parties have expressly stated 
their intent that it does not take place inside the United States. 
When the parties express no intent, U.S. law could be deemed 
to be the default rule if one of the parties is located inside the 
United States. Conversely, non-U.S. law could be the default 
rule if none of the parties are located inside the United States. 
Alternatively, the default rule could depend upon the place 
where the transaction clears. Other factors could be considered 
 
 280. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2006). 
 281. See the district court’s holding on 1934 Act claims in SEC v. Goldman 
Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 163–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), but not on all of the 
1933 Act claims brought by the SEC.  
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as well, although it is best that the rule be clear enough that 
the relevant factors are known to the parties at the time of the 
transaction. In sum, unless other indicators of geography pro-
vide a clear answer as to the location of the transaction, the 
parties’ choice should determine the transaction location and, 
hence, the law that will apply and most likely also the forum in 
which litigation over the transaction will be heard.  
A danger from a pure contract-based approach is the race 
to the bottom phenomenon: if some contracting parties choose a 
jurisdiction with regulations that offer inadequate protection to 
other parties. Such a race to the bottom, however, requires at 
least the consent of both parties (buyers as well as sellers); the 
race to the bottom argument assumes that buyers will simply 
accept whatever securities laws sellers choose. This may be 
true for some exchange-traded securities, and this is a reason 
for preventing choice of law to trump geography for transac-
tions that unequivocally take place inside the United States. In 
private transactions where geography is ambiguous, however, 
buyers may be more sophisticated and also are put on notice 
that foreign law may apply by the very factors that make geog-
raphy ambiguous, for example, where there are non-U.S. par-
ties to the transaction or if the transaction clears outside the 
United States. In these instances, the race to the bottom argu-
ment may not be persuasive.  
The race to the bottom concern is also addressed to some 
extent if SEC and DOJ enforcement follow some securities 
transactions outside the United States, as contemplated by 
Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.282
Regulating buyers rather than transactions could also help 
address the race to the bottom problem. Statutes or regulations 
could restrain some buyers from engaging in securities transac-
tions governed by the laws of jurisdictions that do not offer ad-
equate protection to buyers. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act al-
ready regulates what types of securities certain financial 
institutions may buy, and this trend toward regulating buyers’ 
decisions may continue. Regulating some buyers’ choice of law 
could be a better approach than insisting that the parties have 
no choice of law. Indeed, regulating buyers’ choices may be the 
 While this approach 
may have costs, particularly the risk that a transaction is sub-
ject to the law of more than one jurisdiction, it could mitigate 
the threat of a race to the bottom.  
 
 282. See supra Part II.  
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only effective way of keeping their investments under U.S. se-
curities law because, even if a pure geography based transac-
tion test is retained, it is easy to manipulate. It is relatively ef-
fortless for sophisticated parties to move a transaction to a 
different location if they want a different law to apply.  
In sum, if certain transacting parties’ decisions about 
choice of law seem suboptimal, whether because they are ill-
informed or for some other reason, it could be preferable to re-
quire these particular parties to choose U.S. securities law. 
This approach could be preferable to pretending that there is 
no choice of law for transactions deemed to be in the United 
States, but then allowing parties to take evasive action to relo-
cate transactions outside the United States.  
One way to regulate buyers’ investment decisions is to use 
the “suitability rule” requiring brokers to put customers into 
“suitable” investments.283
C. INTEGRATING CHOICE OF LAW INTO POST-MORRISON 
SECURITIES LAW 
 This rule could be interpreted to pro-
vide that U.S. brokers must recommend to all but the most so-
phisticated individual clients brokerage transactions governed 
by U.S. securities law or the law of other countries with similar 
protections. Persons making investment decisions for retire-
ment funds, foundations, non-profit endowments, and some 
mutual funds could be similarly restricted, at least with respect 
to a certain percentage of their investment portfolios. State and 
local governments could pass laws providing that public funds 
would only be invested in securities transactions governed by 
U.S. law or the law of some countries but not others.  
There are several ways in which transacting parties’ choice 
of law could become a factor in determining when U.S. securi-
ties law applies to a transaction. One approach would be for 
courts interpreting Morrison to take the parties’ choice of law 
into consideration in deciding the location of a transaction.284
 
 283. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation—Retailization, Regulation, 
and Investor Suitability, 28 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581, 630–37 (2009) 
(discussing the application of investor suitability principles in the context of 
hedge fund investing). 
 
 284. If, as suggested in this article, the parties’ choice of law was consid-
ered a determining factor for identifying the location of a transaction, an addi-
tional complication arises if one of the parties seeks to use a choice of U.S. law 
to sue a third party that did not make that choice—for example, an issuer of 
the securities that is outside the United States and takes no steps to cause its 
securities to be traded in the United States. For this reason, the parties’ choice 
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Courts could clarify the post-Morrison environment by identify-
ing certain categories of transactions where transaction loca-
tion will be determined by the parties’ choice of law. This 
“choice of law” category might include private transactions 
where both parties have a presence outside the United States, 
even if the parties also have a presence inside the United 
States as do many large financial institutions. Choice of law 
might also be allowed to determine transaction location where 
only one party has a presence outside the United States but the 
transaction also clears outside the United States—for example, 
a U.S. buyer agrees to purchase securities privately from a 
U.K. seller in a transaction that will settle in London.  
A more debatable situation arises if only one party is pre-
sent in the United States and the transaction clears in the 
United States. Arguably, sophisticated parties in this situation 
should be permitted to agree that the transaction will be gov-
erned by the securities laws of the jurisdiction of the non-U.S. 
party. However, the statutory prohibition on contracting 
around U.S. securities law285
An important factor in determining transaction location in 
all of these situations should be whether the foreign jurisdic-
 suggests that the U.S. party who 
transfers funds inside the United States to buy securities 
should be protected by U.S. law. Another debatable situation 
arises if both parties only have a U.S. presence but the transac-
tion clears outside the United States. Should two U.S. parties 
with no U.K. presence be permitted to agree that only U.K. law 
will apply to their private transaction that clears in London?  
 
of law is most helpful for identifying the location of a transaction in a dispute 
between the transacting parties, or where the SEC or DOJ claims that one of 
the parties defrauded the other. Choice of law is a less helpful factor in situa-
tions where the alleged violator had no role in the choice of law. For example, 
in the Porsche case, discussed supra notes 13 & 80, even if the swap parties 
had agreed that their swap referencing VW stock would be governed by U.S. 
law, this should not give them a right to allege a claim under U.S. law against 
VW, a company whose stock is traded in Germany and not in the United 
States, or a claim against Porsche for its trades in VW stock in Germany. 
 285. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78cc (providing in Section 29(a) that 
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, 
or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.” Section 29(b) 
provides that “[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this chap-
ter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any 
contract for listing a security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, 
the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any 
relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this chapter or any 
rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void . . . .”).  
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tion chosen by the parties actually will accept jurisdiction over 
the transaction and apply its law. If the parties contract for 
U.K. securities law, one risk is that U.K. courts will decline to 
apply U.K. law because the transaction did not clear in the 
U.K, or because one or both parties do not have a U.K. pres-
ence, or for some other reason. If so, the contract to apply non-
U.S. law might as a practical matter mean that no law applies. 
One of the parties—perhaps the party more likely to commit 
securities fraud—might be more aware of this risk than the 
other party. A contract allowing a securities transaction to end 
up in a lawless no-man’s-land probably should not be permit-
ted. 
The complexities in the above discussion suggest, however, 
that U.S. courts have a limited capacity to integrate choice of 
law into a post-Morrison regime defining transaction location. 
There are enough variables in the equation already that courts 
may be reluctant to vary their analysis of transaction location 
because of the parties’ choice of law. The risk of inconsistent 
case law in different districts and in different circuits also in-
creases with the number of variables that courts consider. This 
could be an additional disincentive for courts to embark upon a 
choice of law regime rather than try to make their geographic 
definition of transaction location as consistent as possible with 
that of other courts. Thus, without any clear mandate in Morri-
son to consider contractual choice of law in determining trans-
action location, and with a statutory prohibition on “opting 
out,”286
This is where the SEC could step in to implement a choice 
of law regime through rulemaking. Under the Chevron doc-
trine,
 lower federal courts may prefer to struggle with the 
ambiguities of geography rather than consider choice of law.  
287
 
 286. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78cc.  
 federal courts give considerable deference to federal 
agencies in interpreting the statutes Congress has charged 
them with implementing. If the SEC promulgates a rule defin-
ing transaction location for purposes of the holding in Morrison, 
the federal courts will probably defer to the rule. Indeed, courts 
may welcome such a rule if it helps them avoid struggling to 
define transaction location on their own. The SEC rule could 
take the parties’ choice of law into account in those situations 
where transaction location is otherwise ambiguous.  
 287. See Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
866 (1984).  
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The SEC could also address the problem of dual-listed ex-
change-traded securities which arose in the Vivendi securities 
litigation, although it appears that in this area the district 
courts are defining a relatively clear rule, namely that Section 
10(b) does not apply to dual-listed securities when the transac-
tion takes place on a non-U.S. exchange.288
Another area of complexity is security-based swaps. These 
include transactions that involve U.S.-swap parties and refer-
ence a security only traded outside the United States as in the 
Porsche case,
 The problem may 
become more difficult to resolve for exchanges that establish a 
presence both in the United States and in a non-U.S. jurisdic-
tion. In those instances, an SEC rule could provide that the ex-
change can establish rules designating in which of the two ju-
risdictions a particular transaction takes place. 
289 as well as those that involve only non-U.S. par-
ties but reference a security that is traded inside the United 
States, for example, a German swap referencing common stock 
in General Motors. The SEC should probably promulgate rules 
identifying the location of the transaction for purposes of Sec-
tion 10(b) and perhaps also other relevant provisions of U.S. se-
curities laws.290
Redirecting the focal point of securities regulation from the 
geographic location of securities transactions toward the choice 
of law by buyers and sellers of securities will be controversial, 
but in some transactions where geography is ambiguous it may 
be inevitable. Focusing on the choice of law could be more effec-
tive than trying to impose a single body of law on securities 
transactions within a single geographic area when many secu-
rities transactions at least arguably take place in more than 
one geographic area. Geographic constraints are also rather 
limited in a globalized world where parties can readily change 
transaction locations as they please. If parties’ efforts to ma-
nipulate geography are successful, parties will be able to evade 
the statutory prohibition on opting out of U.S. securities law 
anyway. Clear guidelines for contractually defining the location 
of a securities transaction could be the best alternative.  
 
 
 288. See In re Vivendi Universal Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525–34 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 289. See Elliott Assoc. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 
476 (S.D.N.Y 2010); Brief of Richard W. Painter et al. as Amici Curiae Law 
Professors Supporting Respondents, Viking Global v. Porsche Auto. No. 11-397 
(2d. Cir. Aug. 3, 2011), 2012 WL 453966, at *3. 
 290. See Painter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 228 (dis-
cussing various proposals for SEC rulemaking in this area). 
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Much of the above discussion has focused on parties opting 
out of U.S. securities law and choosing the law of another juris-
diction. For two reasons, however, some parties might prefer 
U.S. law. First, to the extent U.S. law provides more effective 
remedies for securities fraud and better deterrence, parties to 
securities transactions may prefer it and even insist upon it. 
(As already pointed out above, some buyers should perhaps be 
required to engage only in transactions governed by U.S. secu-
rities law.) Second, if exposure to litigation in Dutch courts, or 
in some other non-U.S. jurisdiction, is undesirable, parties may 
want to make sure their transactions are covered by U.S. law. 
Although application of U.S. law is no guarantee that the 
Netherlands or some other jurisdiction will not engage in Fo-
rum Competition and allow simultaneous litigation over the 
same transactions, taking steps to locate a transaction inside 
the United States for purposes of Morrison might convince non-
U.S. courts to stand down and let U.S. courts adjudicate a dis-
pute.  
In sum, choice of law should replace the geographically-
based transactional test in those circumstances where geogra-
phy is ambiguous. Regardless of whether geography or choice of 
law controls, parties should be able to know in advance wheth-
er U.S. securities laws apply, and not have this decision be 
made by courts unpredictably after the fact. Choice of Law 
Competition between the United States and other jurisdictions 
would recognize that different jurisdictions have different sub-
stantive and procedural law and would allow the parties to de-
termine for themselves ex ante which securities laws govern 
their transactions. 
IV.  COORDINATION OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE   
In Morrison, the United States took an important unilat-
eral step away from overreaching in Forum Competition. Be-
fore Morrison, there was a significant risk that U.S. law would 
be applied to securities transactions taking place outside the 
United States because the conduct and effects tests suggested a 
U.S. connection with the alleged fraud. Now the transaction it-
self must have a connection with the United States that is suf-
ficiently strong that a U.S. court will deem the transaction to 
have taken place inside the United States. There is still the po-
tential for U.S. overreaching in some private transactions and 
in unorthodox transactions, such as security-based swaps ref-
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erencing foreign-traded securities, but so far the lower federal 
courts have exercised considerable restraint. Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
and perhaps some transacting parties may seek application of 
U.S. law to transactions that take place beyond our borders, 
but U.S. courts will likely not participate in extensive Forum 
Competition absent a statutory mandate that they do so. 
The notable exception to this restraint is Section 929P of 
the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 929P may apply to securities 
transactions taking place outside the United States. There is a 
risk that SEC and DOJ actions under Section 929P and the 
laws and enforcement policies of non-U.S. jurisdictions may col-
lide. When Section 929P is used, transacting parties are at risk 
of being subjected to the securities laws of two or more jurisdic-
tions whose rules may be inconsistent.  
The developments in the Netherlands thus far do not pose 
too big a risk that parties to securities transactions inside the 
United States will be subjected to litigation in Dutch courts as 
well as in U.S. courts. However, given the massive expansion of 
Dutch jurisdiction in the cases under the WCAM and the trend 
towards a continuing expansion, future developments could 
make it possible that “purely” American cases that pass the 
transactional test under Morrison could also be litigated in the 
Netherlands.  
Dutch courts have already enforced international collective 
settlements where none of the defendants and only a few plain-
tiffs were domiciled in the Netherlands, the alleged wrongdoing 
took place outside the Netherlands, and the claims were not 
brought under Dutch law.291 There is some evidence that Dutch 
courts may uphold jurisdiction in the Netherlands, even with-
out a single interested person domiciled in the Netherlands.292 
There is also evidence that Dutch courts are acting with full 
knowledge of the significance and the implications of their 
judgments, in effect creating an alternative European venue for 
international collective settlements in mass claims.293
 
 291. See Converium COA Decision, supra note 
 Given the 
Dutch Supreme Court’s presumption of reliance/causation in 
32, ¶ 3. 
 292. See Legal Alert Converium, supra note 34, at 2. 
 293. Id. at 3 (“It should be noted that the Court is fully aware of the signifi-
cance of its judgment in creating an alternative venue to declare international 
collective settlements in mass claims binding on all class members. The Court 
explicitly referred to the limitations for the U.S. courts to do so in securities 
and anti-trust cases as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Mor-
rison v. National Australia Bank and Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran.”).  
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prospectus liability cases,294 and its expansion beyond the 
fraud-on-the-market theory,295 it seems possible, if not likely, 
that Dutch courts will continue to expand their theories to oth-
er areas.296
We are not speculating herein as to what the possible con-
sequences of such developments could be. Depending on future 
developments in this context, however, the acceptable outer 
bounds of jurisdictional competition by both Europe and the 
United States might eventually be defined by treaty or other 
multilateral agreement. If the trend toward a substantial ex-
pansion of the Netherlands jurisdiction continues and 
increasses, the Netherlands, and perhaps, the other E.U. mem-
ber states, could agree that civil litigation in Dutch courts, or 
the courts of another E.U. member state, will not include secu-
rities transactions that take place inside the United States and 
that are subject to U.S. law. Alternatively, countries could 
agree that litigation over extraterritorial securities transac-
tions would not go forward if the country where the transac-
tions took place formally objects to the proceeding and provides 
assurance that its own securities laws will be applied to the 
transaction in either a government enforcement proceeding or a 
private lawsuit. If there were to be such a treaty or other 
agreement, the United States could agree to restrain the exer-
cise of the powers that the SEC and DOJ purportedly have un-
der Section 929P so that U.S. enforcement actions do not dis-
rupt non-U.S. markets or the enforcement agenda of non-U.S. 
regulators.  
 In light of these trends, it seems possible that even 
American cases that were not dismissed under Morrison could 
in the future be litigated in Dutch courts.  
Short of treaties or other bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments, U.S. executive branch agencies and courts, as well as 
their foreign counterparts, could take steps to curtail Forum 
Competition that undermines relations with other countries. 
The United States already did so when the Supreme Court de-
 
 294. See HR 27 november 2009, JOR 2010, 43 m.nt. K. Frielink (VEB 
e.a./World Online e.a.) (Neth.), available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ 
detailpage.aspx?ljn=BH2162; de Jong, supra note 25, at 364–65 (discussing 
the World Online decision and its implications); Thompson, supra note 25, at 
1129–44 (explaining the differences of the Dutch and U.S. system of securities 
litigation and underscoring the attractiveness of the Dutch rules).  
 295. See supra Part II.B.3.  
 296. See supra Part II.B.3. Expansion of Dutch courts’ theories could in-
clude liability for misrepresentation in periodic disclosure and other types of 
securities fraud. 
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cided Morrison and Congress in 2010 declined to reinstate pri-
vate lawsuits under the conduct and effects tests. The possibil-
ity that the SEC and DOJ will aggressively use Section 929P 
remains, however, and the SEC should consult with foreign 
regulators and perhaps with the U.S. Department of State be-
fore this provision is used to conduct enforcement actions or in-
vestigations concerning non-U.S. securities transactions. If Sec-
tion 929P causes problems with foreign regulators in the 
future, Congress should amend the statute to require such con-
sultation or even provide the State Department with the power 
to terminate a Section 929P proceeding upon a finding that it 
interferes unacceptably with foreign relations. Countries such 
as the Netherlands that may entertain private lawsuits over 
securities transactions outside their borders should seriously 
consider judicial doctrines based on comity to dismiss or modify 
suits that create a conflict with the laws of other countries. In 
this regard, the pre-Morrison observations of Professor Hannah 
Buxbaum on comity could be very helpful; she suggested in 
2007 that courts applying the conduct and effects tests should 
exercise discretionary dismissal of suits and apply foreign law 
instead of U.S. law in cases where doing otherwise creates a se-
rious conflict with foreign laws.297
  CONCLUSION   
 Although the conduct and ef-
fects tests are now defunct in private litigation in the United 
States after Morrison, Professor Hannah Buxbaum’s suggestion 
and similar suggestions should inform the jurisprudence of 
other jurisdictions that allow private suits over extraterritorial 
transactions. These jurisdictions also might consider a “right to 
sue” procedure in which a domestic securities regulator and the 
jurisdiction’s foreign office must give prior approval for a suit 
over extraterritorial securities transactions to go forward.  
While many jurisdictions could be worse than the United 
States at protecting investors, it is not at all certain that U.S. 
law does a better job of deterring securities fraud. While pri-
vate rights of action (particularly class actions under the fraud-
on-the-market theory) and the SEC enforcement regime in the 
United States are at times vigorous, securities fraud is a per-
sistent problem in the United States. U.S. investment bankers, 
who are supposed to function as gatekeepers, may have worse 
incentives than in some other countries and some cultural 
 
 297. Buxbaum, supra note 224, at 64–67. 
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norms in the United States may encourage securities fraud.298
 
 298. See Claire Hill & Richard W. Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Share-
holder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Lia-
bility, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1177–78 (2010) (arguing that investment 
banks switching from partnerships to corporate forms left bankers with no 
personal liability for failures leading to excessive risk taking). 
 
The U.S. system of civil litigation (class actions under the 
fraud-on-the-market theory) and regulation (including the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010) is 
expensive. Compliance and litigation costs are likely passed on 
to investors. It is not certain that the payoff in less fraud is 
worthwhile. At the very least, there is a good case for allowing 
jurisdictional competition to continue with both the United 
States and other countries using coordination to define both the 
outer limits of choice of law by transacting parties and the out-
er limits of jurisdictional overreach by their regulators and 
courts. 
